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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: Shipping Strategies in Dry Bulk and Tanker Markets:  
   Specialisation versus Diversification 
Degree: MSc 
 
Recent history has shown that shipping cycles have gotten shorter and more volatile.  
Unprecedented highs in freight rates have recently been witnessed followed by 
market free falls, exposing shipowners/managers to ever increasing amounts of risk.  
Traditionally, an investor in the maritime transportation industry would seek to 
spread this risk by diversifying the assets in which he invests, which for the purpose 
of this dissertation are dry bulk and tanker vessels.  Ships are therefore considered 
assets which form a portfolio and the degree to which a portfolio is diversified or 
specialised depends on the type of vessels included in a fleet.  Furthermore, vessels 
may be fixed on the spot market or the time charter market, which affects the 
volatility and the earnings that an investor would expect. 
A detailed analysis is carried out of the earnings between 1991 and 2009 in four dry 
bulk sectors and four tanker sectors employed on the spot market, on 1-year time 
charters and 3-year time charters.  Armed with this data, the correlation between all 
the market sectors, mean earnings and volatility can be calculated in order to apply 
the Portfolio Theory, thereby determining which combination of assets is most 
suitable for an investor. 
Additionally, another in depth analysis is carried out of companies involved in 
maritime transportation which are listed on five different stock exchanges in Europe 
and the United States of America. By analysing each company’s share value and 
volatility between 2005 and 2009, the Capital Asset Pricing Model can then be 
applied to determine how the company performed.  A comparison of each company’s 
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performance with market freight rates allows for a conclusion to be drawn on the 
impact each strategy had on a company’s share price and beta value. 
The final chapter draws a conclusion on whether a strategy can be singled out as the 
most appropriate.  Furthermore, qualitative data is introduced to further strengthen 
the support for either a specialised or a diversified shipping strategy. 
KEYWORDS: Portfolio Theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model, Volatility, Beta 
 Value, Risk 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The question of whether a shipping company should specialise or diversify its 
activities is a recurrent issue in shipping. The objective of this dissertation is to 
assess the effectiveness of these two strategies for dry bulk and tanker markets using 
the Portfolio Theory. The application to tramp market was motivated by the fact that 
it has been described as the closest scenario to perfect competition as prices are 
largely dependent on the relationship between buyers and sellers.  Both groups are 
numerous, with equal bargaining power; no barriers to entry or exit; freight is a 
relatively homogenous service and where demand is rather elastic (Branch, 1996).  
Any shift in balance creates great opportunities or risks (business cycles) for an 
investor in shipping.  This chapter briefly presents the sources of shipping business 
risks (1.1) and methods of risk management (1.2). 
1.1 Sources of Shipping Business Risks 
For centuries, a boom in trade, an oil crisis, a war, closure of certain routes and 
aggressive economic policies by various countries have all produced an imbalance 
between supply and demand, making freight rates soar.  The reverse is also true and 
over supply of tonnage, reduced international trade or an economic crisis can send 
freight rates crashing to below breakeven point required by shipowners to meet their 
operating costs as well as their capital and interest costs.  Shipping cycles are made 
even more unpredictable due to the strong impact of investors’ decisions, which are 
not always rational for want of trying to play the market and reacting to it. 
It implies that a business involved in the ownership and/or management of ships 
exposes itself to a substantial amount of risk.  A shipping company, like any other 
business interest, must be willing to take on operational risk (general business risk), 
which is caused by the fluctuations in Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT).  
This is determined by the income and expenditure of the company, and therefore the 
amount of risk is determined by the variability of these two factors.  In shipping, 
these include freight rates, voyage costs, operating costs and foreign exchange rates.   
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A substantial part of the overall cash-flow position of a shipowner emanates from 
changes in the value of the asset (the ship), which vary greatly according to the stage 
of the shipping cycle. Therefore, ownership risk is another aspect which an investor 
must consider (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006). 
Another serious type of risk that must be taken into consideration by a 
shipowner/manager is counterparty risk, which arises due to non-performance of 
counterparties to transactions (Dash, 2004), causing a shipowner to suffer a loss 
(Smith & Walter, 2003).  The provision of seaborne transportation is ultimately a 
service provided in return for remuneration (freight/hire), which is always substantial  
The likelihood of the default occurring is known as the probability of default.  The 
risk of accidents and loss is another factor which can affect the operation of a vessel 
and therefore the cash-flow of the company. 
Like any other international company, a shipowner/manager must factor in interest-
rate risk and exchange-rate risk. Given the capital intensive industry that shipping is 
and the high income and expenditure, exposure to these types of risk can be crippling 
to a company (Kavussanos, 2009). 
Cycles are common to many industries and the economy as a whole, so much that the 
shipping cycles are intrinsically linked to the economic cycles.  Within the shipping 
industry, cycles lie at the very heart of shipping risk and therefore must be 
understood in order for a shipowner to limit his exposure to this risk. 
The long-term trend and the short-term trend must be distinguished.  The former is a 
long-term cycle referred to by Cournot as the ‘secular trend’ (Cournot, 1927).  These 
cycles are sustained or expected to be sustained over the long-term and are used to 
distinguish the underlying long-term trends from seasonal variations and the effects 
of economic cycles (Pietersz, 2009).  They are driven by technical, economic or 
regional change and although they may be hard to detect, they are of great 
importance to businesses when they are in ascendancy or decline. 
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The second type of cycle is probably the most important and is referred to as the 
short-term cycle or the ‘business cycle’.  They are crucial as they are the form the 
economic business cycles take, and they are the drivers of shipping market cycles.    
With regards shipping cycles there are four main stages: a market trough, a recovery, 
a market peak, and a collapse. 
By analysing the 22 cycles that have occurred over the last 266 years, Martin 
Stopford (2008) reveals that the length of shipping market cycles have decreased 
over time.  The average length of a cycle fell from 12.5 years in 1743 to 7.5 in 2003 
most probably due to technology and global communications.  The result of shorter 
cycles is that the length of each individual stage decreases, meaning sharper market 
recoveries and collapses.  It is therefore essential that shipowners have the proper 
tools for accurate forecasting so a shipowner could reap the benefits of market peaks 
and be flexible enough to protect his exposure during market troughs. 
Finally, the third type of cycle is seasonal, which is extremely evident in shipping.  
There are particular times of the year when freight rates peak for certain commodities 
due to a high demand for that particular commodity.  Noticeable examples are the 
surge in grain movements during late September and October as the North American 
harvest reaches the sea for shipment or the great demand for oil before the winter 
season. 
1.2 Methods of Risk Management 
Ships are viewed as investments that generate income through freight and possibly 
capital gains, if a vessel is sold at the correct time within the shipping cycle.  
Therefore, for all intents and purposes, ships are assets that form a portfolio and are 
bought and sold in a manner that will best suit the investor’s risk management 
strategy.  The shipping industry consists of a large number of sectors which 
determine the type of vessel employed in different trades.  Vessels used for carrying 
passengers obviously differ from those used to carry bulk cargo; and ships used to 
transport bulk cargoes differ from containerised goods; and containerised goods are 
shipped on different size vessels according to the region or routes on which they are 
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traded.  These different shipping sectors require specialised expertise and yield 
different freight rates which an investor should be well aware of.  Even the period for 
which a vessel is employed by a charterer would alter the shipowner’s income. 
Therefore, freight data arms an investor with the knowledge to enter different sectors 
that would limit his risk and the three traditional methods of doing so are the 
following.  
Firstly, Spot Market vs. Time Charter Market.  Contracting similar vessels on the 
same route for varying lengths of time constitute different markets and therefore 
involve different risks.  Spot market contracts are short term and very responsive to 
the current market conditions as negotiations are carried out at relatively short 
intervals when compared to a time charter for anything above one year.  As a result, 
shipowners employing their ships on the spot market must accept the prevailing 
freight rate at the time of negotiations which are extremely volatile.  Voyage costs, 
including bunkers, are paid by the shipowner for each voyage, which adds the extra 
risk of bunker price volatility to the equation.  Furthermore, in the spot market a 
shipowner risks more frequent periods of unemployment, bears the relocation costs 
so all these procedures require more ground based personnel coordinating 
everything.  Finally, from a financing aspect, banks require security which is evident 
in a time charterparty but not in the spot market. 
Ideally, a shipowner would have as many vessels employed on the spot market 
during the peak stage of a cycle and subsequently fix as many vessels on a time 
charter just before the market collapses.  This is easier said than done given that time 
charters are not flexible and may be fixed right through the cycle peak and end 
during a market trough, exposing the shipowner to lower freight rates upon 
renegotiation.  However, this manner of employing vessels has been going on for 
over a century, and has always proved a fruitful exercise for ensuring steady income 
and reducing a shipowners’ exposure to business risk. 
Secondly, dry bulk versus tanker markets.  Dry and liquid bulk cargoes are 
subdivided according to the Parcel Size Distribution (PSD) of an individual 
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consignment of cargo for shipment.  There are hundreds of commodities that need to 
be shipped and each has its own PSD, the shape of which is determined by its 
economic characteristics.  This is determined by the stock levels held by users, the 
depth of water at the loading and discharging terminals, and the cost savings by using 
a bigger ship.  Iron ore is almost always shipped in vessels over 100,000dwt, with a 
large amount of shipments on vessels of 150,000dwt.  Individual shipments of coal 
range in size from under 20,000 tons to over 160,000 tons; however, shipments are 
mainly clustered around 60,000 tons and 150,000 tons.  Therefore, it is no surprise 
that 70% of the iron trade is transported on Capesize vessels followed by 45% of coal 
and 7% of grain.  The grain trade differs slightly with only a few parcels of over 
100,000 tons, but many parcels of around 60,000tons, traded primarily on Panamax 
vessels (Stopford, 2009).   
Smaller vessels like Handy vessels are made more flexible in the manner in which 
they are employed, carrying more types of cargoes such as coal, grain, scrap metal, 
bauxite, alumina and phosphate rock (Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2006).  Furthermore, 
86% of Handy size vessels are geared and on average have a draft of 10 metres.  
These characteristics allow this class of vessels access to a great number of ports, 
ports which cannot be accessed by larger vessels, either due to their deeper draft 
requirements or because the vessels are not likely to be geared and the ports do not 
have the necessary equipment to un/load cargo (Stopford, 2009). 
The consequence of these factors is that freight rates for larger vessels are more 
volatile than those for smaller vessels, as their trade is more restricted.  A shipowner 
may develop his risk management strategy by investing in different ships 
accordingly. 
Thirdly, derivatives, a more modern method of risk management in shipping, 
provides a more flexible strategy than the two above mentioned methods.  They are 
used to hedge against freight risks as well as other risk exposures, including foreign 
exchange, bunkers, interest rates, and vessel value risk.  These instruments have 
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contractually created rights and obligations, which allow a shipowner to transfer risk 
to another person willing to bear it. 
This dissertation focuses on the first two ways to hedge against risk (spot versus time 
charter markets and dry bulk versus tanker vessels). Before assessing the 
effectiveness of these strategies, by using the Portfolio Theory in Chapter 3 and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model in Chapter 4, the next chapter presents the main 
developments in dry bulk and tanker markets from 1991 to 2009.  
 

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Chapter 2. Development of the Dry Bulk and Tanker 
Markets 
Before analysing the freight rate data for the last 20 years of the dry bulk (2.1) and 
tanker (2.2) markets, it is important to understand certain events that have driven 
both sectors since 1990 knowing that the rise and fall of freight rates between 2003 
and 2009 are unprecedented and due consideration must be given to these events. 
As the condition of the global economy deteriorated at the beginning of the 1990s, 
deliveries had fallen to 4 million dwt per annum, compared with 16 million dwt of 
tanker deliveries.  Therefore, despite the recession, the tonnage was easily absorbed 
and the dry bulk freight rates maintained healthier levels than those of tankers.  
However, after five years of relatively strong returns, deliveries built up in 1996 and 
as the Asian Crisis set in, freight rates plummeted.  As the Asian economies 
recovered, so did dry bulk freight rates, albeit at a less forceful pace than seen in the 
tanker markets.  The dot.com crisis delivered another blow to the dry bulk market, 
but by 2003, this sector began the recovery stage of a ‘super-cycle’ (Stopford, 2009).  
In the dry bulk sector, the Capesize freight rates are a good indicator of the market’s 
overall performance.  As explained in section 1.3, iron ore and coal, which are 
essential for steel production, are the two major commodities transported on 
Capesize vessels. This makes the Capesize market extremely sensitive to the global 
industrial production and the overall performance of the global economy.  In fact, the 
relationship of daily earnings of a 1990s-built Capesize vessel and the year-on-year 
change in Japanese steel production is extremely close.  The turning points in the 
steel production growth rate have in the past predicted the direction of the Cape 
market with near perfection, with a few months buffer (Clarksons Research Studies, 
2003). 
According to the ‘Japanese steel production’ indicator, as steel production falls, iron 
ore imports decrease and subsequently capesize freight rates.  Such was the case 
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during the recession of the early 1990s and the ‘Asia Crisis’ which began in the 
second half of 1997.  Likewise, when steel production begins to increase, so does the 
Baltic Capesize Index (BCI). However, during the dot.com crisis in 2001 and the 
2008 financial crisis, China, one of the big three iron ore importers, continuously 
increased its imports, thereby overshadowing any indication offered by Japanese 
steel production. 
Iron Ore Imports 
 
Figure 1.1 Iron Ore Import of the ‘Big Three’ Importers, 1991-2008 (Yearly Data) 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
The situation was made even more precarious by the sliding coal prices and rising 
freight rates, which lead buyers of coal to take a wait-and-see attitude.  Therefore, the 
iron ore trade became the primary driver of the Capesize earnings surge from 2000 
onwards.  This new trend distorted the market as at times the Capesize market was 
dependent on the vagaries of a single trade, which made an already risky industry, 
that much more volatile (Clarksons Research Studies, 2003).  When demand for 
coking coal increased, this further strengthened the dry bulk freight rates as exports 
began to increase (Clarksons Research Studies, 2004).  Furthermore, the high oil 
prices lead to many countries, notably the USA, Germany and Japan to switch to coal 
fired power plants increasing the demand for thermal coal from the power generation 
industry, thereby tying up even more tonnage. 
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Coal Imports 
 
Figure 1.2 Coal Import of the ‘Big Three’ Importers, 1991-2008 (Yearly Data) 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Note: EU25: EU15 until 2003; EU25 thereafter 
As the ‘supercycle’ progressed, mining companies were operating at full capacity to 
meet the ever growing demand.  Delays began to arise at ports particularly in China, 
Brazil and Australia, where three week delays kept upwards of 50 vessels waiting.  
Delays were mainly due to bad heavy fog, low stockpiles, poor inland connections 
and equipment breakdown in China, while port facilities were badly damaged in 
Australia due to cyclones (Clarksons Research Studies, 2004). 
As iron ore imports decline both volume and tonne mile trade reduces, thereby 
increasing the supply of vessels available and reducing freight rates.  This situation is 
witnessed in market recession.  A certain amount of demand always remains and this 
is satisfied by short haul shipments; however, this is never enough to absorb the freed 
up tonnage from longer shipments, which employ between 2-3 times the number of 
vessels to ship the equivalent volume (Clarksons Research Studies, 2001). 
When freight rates rise, trading patterns are also affected, as importers seek to lower 
freight rates by reducing tonne miles.  For example, traditionally, half of the 
Japanese iron ore imports come from Australia, followed by Brazil and India.  
However, as freight rates rose, India became a serious threat to Brazil, often 
overtaking it as the second-largest importer to Japan (Clarksons Research Studies, 
2003).   
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What was unique about the ‘super-cycle, was primarily that China continuously 
increased its volume of traded commodities and also becoming the largest importer 
of iron ore in the world in 2003, surpassing Japan.  Secondly, China also moved 
towards more distant suppliers of ore.  Australia has logically been China’s primary 
supplier; however, over the last five years, Brazil increased their market share at the 
expense of India; subsequently, increasing tonne-miles and tying up more vessels 
(Clarksons Research Studies, 2005). 
The prolonged period of high freight rates discouraged investors from demolishing 
vessels and investing in new tonnage, leaving the dry bulk sector extremely 
vulnerable to a downturn, which eventually arrived in the second half of 2008.
During the first half of the 1990s, the tanker and bulk carrier markets developed very 
differently, mostly because of investors’ perceptions of the two markets.  The tanker 
market peak prior to the 1990s recession spurred investors to orders for 55 million 
dwt of new tankers, based on three expectations.  Firstly, a scrapping spree was 
expected as the 1970s-built tanker fleet was ageing, creating heavy replacement 
demand in the mid-1990s.  Secondly, since shipbuilding capacity had shrunk 
throughout the 1980s, many observers expected a shortage when replacements were 
necessary.  Finally, growing oil demand was expected to be met from long-haul 
Middle East exports, creating rapidly increasing demand for tankers, especially 
VLCCs.  Unfortunately, none of these forecasts were realised and the substantial 
tanker order book pushed the market into a recession, which lasted from early 1992 
to the middle of 1995 (Stopford, 2009). 
The ‘Asia crisis’ also had an impact on the tanker market and by spring of 2008 
freight rates came crashing down bottoming out at less than $10,000 a day in 
September 1999.  On the upside, negative sentiment throughout the nineties triggered 
heavy scrapping of the 1970s-built tankers, and as a result the tanker fleet grew very 
slowly and freight rates surged to new peaks.  Like the dry bulk market, the surge in 
freight rates were soon dampened by the onset of the dot.com slump, which brought 
VLCC freight rates back to the low levels of 1999.  The terrorist attacks in the United 
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States of America on the 11th September, 2001, did however make the price of oil 
shoot up and consequently, tanker rates.  However, the knock-on effects of the 
attacks, the economic slowdown and a warmer than normal winter in the Northern 
Hemisphere, reduced demand resulting in a decrease in tanker freight rates 
(Clarksons Research Studies, 2001). 
As the recovery began in 2003, a considerable turnaround was witnessed.  A market 
trough coupled with the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
struggling to keep oil prices above the lower barrier of their $22-$28/bbl preferred 
price range soon became record earnings and two consecutive cuts in oil production 
(Clarksons Research Studies, 2004). 
With the upturn of the global economy, demand for oil began to increase 
considerably, notably in China and the USA.  However, supply concerns started to 
grow as the market experienced shock after shock.  To begin, OPEC failed to 
anticipate the demand level, Iraq was blighted with instability, several terrorist 
incidents in Saudi Arabia, industrial action in Norway and Nigeria, ethnic unrest in 
West Africa and a presidential recall referendum in Venezuela, all lead oil prices and 
freight rates to rise considerably (Clarksons Research Studies, 2004).  Crude prices 
continued to rise due to concerns about the potential tight balance between supply 
and demand in the short-to-medium term (both in terms of volume availability and 
the relative sweet-sour split) and as Hurricane Katrina rolled into the Gulf of Mexico 
in the summer of 2005, fears were further heightened (Clarksons Research Studies, 
2005). 
Crude prices continued to react to fears that production limits were being reached 
and that energy needs of developing countries were putting further strains on the 
supply side.  The perceived lack of refinery capacity also pushed up product prices. 
The same market fundamentals persisted for the next few years, but 2006 and 2007 
became synonymous with uncertainty and high oil prices, despite freight rates faring 
well (Clarksons Research Studies, 2007).  By March 2008 oil was at $111/bbl, that 
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is, with prices adjusted for inflation, it was more expensive than at the time of the 
second oil crisis after the Iranian revolution.  However, by the end of the year, the 
tanker market could not avoid the repercussions of the financial crisis, despite being 
more resilient than the dry bulk sector. 
2.1 Application to Dry Bulk Markets (1991-2009) 
When thinking of investing in the dry bulk market, different classifications can be 
used: firstly, according to the different employment of the vessel, there is the 
possibility to make a distinction between three contracts (spot, 1-year time charter 
and 3-year time charter); secondly, according to the main type of vessels, which 
leads to a distinction between Capesize, Panamax, Handymax and Handysize vessels.  
In combining these two classifications, 12 (3x4) different projects could ultimately 
be considered for which information on earnings, on standard deviation and on the 
correlation coefficient are required in order to identify the most efficient investment.  
Table 2.1 presents the performance (mean and standard deviation) of these 12 
different projects derived from their monthly earnings from December 1991 to May 
2009. From this table, it appears that estimates are consistent with expectations 
namely: 1) the shorter the contract duration is, the higher the earnings; and 2) the 
bigger the size of the vessel is, the less trade routes are available on which to employ 
the vessel, thereby increasing risk (standard deviation). 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Spot, 1-Year, and 3-Year Time Charter Rates for Dry Bulk 
 Vessels. 
 Spot Rates 1 Year T/C Rate 3 Year T/C Rate 
Class of 
Vessel 
Mean TCE 
($/day) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
($/day) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
($/day) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Capesize 30,488 31,129 28,759 28,401 24,246 19,058 
Panamax 18,634 17,463 14,894 13,276 12,000 7,690 
Handymax 14,591 11,449 14,584 11,459 12,353 6,991 
Handysize 11,240 8,643 11,288 8,035 10,182 5,051 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
The performance of the 4 different vessels will be evaluated for each different 
contract (3-year time charter, 1-year time charter and spot) in next sub-section.  
Furthermore, for each individual vessel type, the earnings and standard deviation are 
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first examined (2.2.1) and the correlation coefficient then estimated (3.2), based on 
monthly data from 1991 to 2009 derived from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence 
Network. 
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Turning first to the 3-year contract, the three-year time charter rate distribution for a 
Capesize bulk carrier between December 1991 and May 2009 is astronomical for 
what is perceived as a long term contract.  Rates fell to as low as $8,000 per day and 
rose to $107,500 per day with daily volatility at $19,058.  A low charter rate average 
of $24,246 throughout the entire period meant that earnings volatility accounted for 
79% of the mean.  Statistically, and at 99% level based on the mean earnings plus 
three standard deviations, earnings would not exceed $81,420 per day. 
3-Year Time Charter Market Earnings 
 
Figure 2.1 Dry Bulk 3-Year Time Charter Rates, 1991-2009 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of 3-Year Time Charter Rates for Dry Bulk Vessels. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
$/day 
Standard Deviation 
 $/day         % mean 
Capesize 24,246 19,058 79% 
Panamax 12,000 7,690 64% 
Handymax 12,353 6,991 57% 
Handysize 10,182 5,051 50% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author  
An interesting comparison emerges in the three-year time charter rates between the 
Panamax and Handymax vessels. Panamax bulk carrier rates ranged between $6,150 
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per day and $46,250 per day between December 1991 and May 2009, while for a 
Handymax bulk carrier, freight rates varied between $6,500 and $38,500 per day for 
the same period.  It is immediately visible that the lowest earnings for the smaller 
vessels were above those of a Panamax bulker. Furthermore, on average, the 
Handymax sector fared better than the Panamax sector as the former had average 
returns of $12,353 compared to average earnings of $12,000 in the Panamax sector.  
This was coupled with less volatility experienced in the Handymax sector, at $6,991 
per day.  However, it must be mentioned that Handymax returns did not reach the 
highs of the Panamax sector but statistically, and at 99% confidence, the Handymax 
earnings would not exceed $33,326 per day, while Panamax earnings would not 
exceed $35,070, a mere $1,744 per day less.  With regard to the Handysize sector, 
the lowest standard deviation was in this sector at $5,051 per day.  Throughout the 
period under scrutiny, the market bottomed out at $6,025 and reached a high of 
$28,375, well below the lowest earnings of any of the larger sectors.  Expected 
earnings were within a much tighter bracket, and 99% of the time earnings would not 
top $25,335 per day. 
With regards to one-year time charter rates, as expected, the rate distribution for a 
Capesize bulk carrier between December 1991 and May 2009 is even more 
impressive than its three-year time charter counterpart.  The market’s nadir was $7, 
800 per day but at times soared to unprecedented rates of $137,200 per day.  
Throughout this period, earnings per day averaged $28,759 with a substantial 
fluctuation in earnings per day which was almost the equivalent amount.  
Furthermore, little assurances were provided statistically, as 99% of the time 
earnings would not surpass $113,962 per day, which still leaves earnings open to a 
considerable range (based on the mean earnings plus three standard deviations). 
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Dry Bulk 1-Year Time Charter Earnings 
 
Figure 2.2 Dry Bulk 1-Year Time Charter Earnings, 1991-2009 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics of 1-Year Time Charter Rates for Dry Bulk Vessels. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
$/day 
Standard Deviation 
 $/day         % mean 
Capesize 28,759 28,401 99% 
Panamax 14,894 13,276 89% 
Handymax 14,584 11,459 79% 
Handysize 11,288 8,035 71% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author  
A slight divergence from the pattern in three-year time charter rates can be noted in 
the one-year time charter earnings when comparing the Panamax and Handymax 
sectors.  The former had higher average earnings for the entire period at $14,894 per 
day when compared to Handymax average earnings of $14,584 per day.  
Furthermore, despite the mean earnings for the Panamax sector being a mere $310 
higher than the Handymax sector in the one-year time charters, the gap of earnings 
expected 99% of the time widened to $5,761 in favour of Panamax vessels. 
Other similarities did trickle down to shorter term contracts, as the lowest earnings in 
the Handymax sector ($5,813 per day) were once again higher than those 
experienced in the Panamax market ($5,063 per day).  However, then again there 
was a difference of almost $15,000 per day between the market peaks in favour of 
the Panamax sector.  
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Also, as expected, as vessel size decreases, so does the volatility of earnings and this 
was indeed the case.  The standard deviation for Panamax earnings totalled $13,276 
per day as compared to $11,459 per day in the Handymax market.  Finally, the 
Handysize sector proved to be the most stable as the range of earnings was the 
narrowest of all the markets, with the low point being $5,088 per day and peaking at 
$40,800 per day.  Mean earnings for the entire period were $11,288 per day.  With a 
standard deviation of $8,035 and earnings not expected to exceed $35,393 per day, 
99% of the time, the market was offered additional stability as there was a further 
narrowing of the expected price range. 
Finally, for the spot market earnings, a few issues must be first considered.  While a 
spot earnings index and a Time Charter Equivalent (TCE) is readily available for 
vessels at the larger end of the market, the same is not true for both the Handy 
classed vessels.  Due to the variety of cargoes and the enormous amount of routes on 
which Handy classed vessels are chartered, it is extremely difficult to set a spot 
earnings index for all these routes and cargoes.  It is for this reason that Clarksons 
does not provide such data, and therefore trip-time charter rates for the Handymax 
class and six-month time charter rates for the Handysize sector will be considered. 
Once again, the range of earnings experienced in all sectors increased to a dizzying 
extent, when compared to longer term contracts.  However, some unexpected results 
do also emerge from the findings.  To begin with, average earnings and volatility did 
not increase across the board, as is normally expected with short term contracts in the 
business world.  While the two larger markets seemed to have thrived when trading 
on the spot market, the same does not seem to be true for the Handy markets. 
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Dry Bulk Spot Market Earnings 
 
Figure 2.3 Dry Bulk Spot Charter Earnings, 1991-2009 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Table 2.4 Summary Statistics of Spot Charter Rates for Dry Bulk Vessels. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
$/day 
Standard Deviation 
 $/day         % mean 
Capesize 30,488 31,129 102% 
Panamax 18,634 17,463 94% 
Handymax 14,591 11,449 78% 
Handysize 11,240 8,643 77% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
With regard the rate distribution for a Capesize bulk carrier between December 1991 
and May 2009, earnings ranged from a low $4,095 per day to an astronomical height 
of $173,703 per day, averaging $30,488 per day.  While the nadir is the lowest of all 
three types of charters, likewise the zenith is over $66,000 per day above its one-year 
time charter equivalent.  Even more impressive is that the standard deviation is 
$31,129 per day, which is even greater than the sector’s average earnings!  This only 
compounds the uncertainty in this market as fewer assurances can be provided by 
freight rate analysis as rates were as likely to reach $123,875 (based on the mean 
earnings plus three standard deviations), as they were to plummet to below 
breakeven point.  Using the standard deviation as a percentage of the mean earnings 
it can be seen that the volatility of the monthly spot earnings in the Capesize sector is 
102%.  If assuming that average earnings are the revenue stream needed to run the 
business and make a normal profit, shipping companies operating purely in the 
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Capesize sector could be earning over 100% more than is required or with virtually 
no income at all.  To put this into perspective, according to Stopford (2008), a 
month-to-month volatility of 10% in most business sectors is considered extreme. 
Very similar to the Capesize sector, is the Panamax market, as freight rates dropped 
to $4,191 per day – the lowest of all charterparties.  Likewise, the market peaked at 
$86,244, almost $40,000 per day more than the peak of the one-year time-charter 
daily earnings.  The standard deviation for earnings also increased to 94% of the 
mean earnings at $17,463.  The biggest increase in average earnings over the entire 
period was experienced in the Panamax sector, when compared to longer 
charterparties. 
When comparing Panamax spot rates with the Handymax trip charter rates, a more 
rational and clearer delineation of the markets is apparent.  At their lowest point, 
Handymax earnings were less than earnings at the lowest point in the Panamax 
sector.  Likewise, when the Panamax market peaked, earnings were a good deal 
higher than maximum earnings at the peak of the Handymax market.  The average 
earnings were also higher in the Panamax sector and the volatility of the freight rates 
was substantially higher, bringing the Panamax sector more in line with the Capesize 
sector in this respect. 
With regard to the Handymax sector; the average earnings for the entire period 
increased by a measly $7 per day to $14,591, although a wider range of earnings is 
clearly visible, dipping to $3,985 per day and rising $61,013 per day.   
Daily fluctuations in earnings stood at $11,449, slightly lower than the scenario in 
the one-year time charter.  The slight increase in average earnings, coupled with the 
minor decrease in earnings’ fluctuations, means that the standard deviation as a 
percentage of the average earnings for the entire period did in fact decrease by 1% 
compared to that of the one-year time charter. 
Finally, when analysing the Handysize earnings, it must be borne in mind that the 
closest earnings to spot rates are the six-month time charters.  Therefore, when 
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compared to the other sectors’ spot earnings, the results may be slightly distorted.  
Nonetheless, the data from a six-month time charter still provides a credible 
comparison to the longer term charters in the Handysize sector.  The range of 
earnings broadened even more than that seen in the Handymax trip charter earnings, 
with rates falling to $4,788 per day and peaking at $48,125 per day.  What is 
interesting is that the average earnings for the entire period were $11,240, falling 
slightly compared to the one-year time charter result.    A slight increase in the daily 
volatility of earnings translates into 77% of average earnings for the entire period.  
Therefore, when taken as a percentage of the respective markets’ average earnings, 
the two Handy sectors had a similar standard deviation. 
2.2 Application to Tanker Markets (1991-2009) 
Similar classifications to the dry bulk market can be used when weighing up the 
possible investments in the tanker sector.  Once again, the first classification is 
according to the different employment of the vessels, that is, spot market, 1-year time 
charter and 3-year time charter; secondly, a distinction according to the main type of 
tankers which is obviously different to that of the dry bulk market.  The classification 
of tankers may vary but for the purpose of this dissertation, four categories for which 
there is the most data have been selected, and these are: Very Large Crude Carriers 
(VLCC), Suezmax, Aframax and Products tankers.  The combination of these two 
classifications provides an investor with another 12 (3x4) possible projects for which 
the same methodology as above would be applied in order to deduce the most 
efficient investment.  
Table 2.5 presents the performance (mean and standard deviation) of these 12 
different projects derived from their monthly earnings from December 1991 to May 
2009.  From this table, it is intriguing to note that estimates are not consistent with all 
expectations.  The increase in earnings as the contract duration decreases is 
consistent with expectations.  However, the volatility of earnings (standard 
deviation) does not always increase as the size of the vessels increase. 
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Table 2.5 Summary Statistics of Spot, 1-Year, and 3-Year Time Charter Rates for Tanker 
 Vessels.
 Spot Rates 1 Year T/C Rate 3 Year T/C Rate 
Class of 
Vessel 
Mean TCE 
($/day) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
($/day) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
($/day) 
Standard 
Deviation 
VLCC 38,995 29,674 34,495 11,424 32,804 5,396 
Suezmax 31,624 22,105 23,958 7,978 22,303 4,621 
Aframax 25,524 14,999 18,774 4,701 18,018 2,388 
Products 17,508 9,299 14,881 5,118 14,791 3,381 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
The performance of the 4 different vessels will be evaluated for each different 
contract (3-year time charter, 1-year time charter and spot) in the next sub-section.  
Based on monthly data from 1991 to 2009, derived from Clarksons Shipping 
Intelligence Network, the earnings and standard deviation (2.2.1) and the correlation 
coefficient (3.2) are estimated for each vessel type. 
 	

 

Beginning with an analysis of the 3-Year time charter statistics, the VLCC market 
ranged from $23,875 per day to $45,250 per day, averaging $32,804 per day.   The 
VLCC market did experience the greatest volatility of all the tanker sectors, with 
fluctuations averaging $5,396 per day.  However, as a percentage of the mean 
earnings per day this equates to 16% and does not turn out to be the most volatile.  
Putting this into perspective once again, if the mean earnings are the income needed 
to run the business and turn a profit, a VLCC operator, more often than not, earns 
16% more or less than is required.  Considering the volatile nature of the shipping 
industry, which normally tends to increase with the size of the vessels, the statistics 
are quite encouraging.  Particularly, when set against the Suezmax data which has 
had a greater standard deviation as a percentage of the mean and a lower average 
income for almost two decades. 
The earnings volatility for the Suezmax sector was $4,621, that is, 21% of the mean 
earnings.  The market earnings experienced the widest range of income ranging from 
$13,000 per day to $36,125 per day and averaged for the total period $22,303. 
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Tanker Three-Year Time Charter Earnings 
 
Figure 2.4 Tanker 3-Year Time Charter Rates, 1991-2009 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
 
Table 2.6 Summary Statistics of 3-Year Time Charter Rates for Tanker Vessels. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
$/day 
Standard Deviation 
 $/day         % mean 
VLCC 32,804 5,396 16% 
Suezmax 22,303 4,621 21% 
Aframax 18,018 2,388 13% 
Product 14,791 3,381 23% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
The range of Aframax earnings were more in line with the Products tanker market, 
dipping to $13,500 per day and rising to $25,875 per day, averaging $18,018.  This 
sector proved to be the least volatile of all, both with regard to the standard deviation 
of $2,388 and as percentage of the mean earnings, which was 18% for the analysed 
period.  While 13% may be considered extremely risky in other business sectors, 
compared to all the other dry bulk and tanker earnings volatility, the Aframax sector 
proved to be the least volatile over the last two decades.  Furthermore, with 99% 
certainty that rates would not exceed $25,182 per day, just below the maximum 
earnings, would indicate that the range of earnings seemed to be relatively stable 
throughout the years.  
Interestingly enough, the products tanker sector proved to be the most volatile, with a 
volatility of 23% of the mean earnings.  This equates to a standard deviation of 
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$3,381 per day within a fairly restricted range of earnings from a low of $10,500 per 
day to a high of 21,750 per day. 
Tanker One-Year Time Charter Earnings 
 
Figure 2.5 Tanker 1-Year Time Charter Rates, 1991-2009 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Table 2.7 Summary Statistics of 1-Year Time Charter Rates for Tanker Vessels. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
$/day 
Standard Deviation 
 $/day         % mean 
VLCC 34,495 11,424 33% 
Suezmax 23,958 7,978 33% 
Aframax 18,774 4,701 25% 
Product 14,881 5,118 34% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
The range of earnings experienced in all sectors did increase when compared to the 
three-year time charters, with the widest range of earnings experienced in the VLCC 
market and narrowing as the vessels size got smaller.  A slight increase in the mean 
earnings as well as the standard deviation can be noted in all tanker sectors.  These 
two characteristics are to be expected as they are natural changes when dealing with 
shorter term contracts. 
With regard to the increase in standard deviation, the most substantial increase was 
in the VLCC market.  Three-year time charter earnings in the VLCC market had a 
lower standard deviation per day than witnessed in the Suezmax market.  However, 
the considerable increase brings it on par with that of the Suezmax market when 
dealing with one-year time charter earnings. 
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The VLCC markets recorded an earnings distribution from a low of $19,438 per day, 
to a high of $76,250 per day, with an overall average of $34,495.  The standard 
deviation per day was $11,424 per day, that is, 33% of the overall average; more than 
double that of the three-year time charter equivalent. 
In the Suezmax market, earnings volatility as a percentage of the overall period 
average was equivalent to that in the VLCC market but with substantially less 
average earnings.  Earnings ranged from $11,000 per day to $49,000 per day with an 
overall average of $23,958. 
One trend that does trickle down from the longer time charterparties is that the 
lowest standard deviation is recorded in the Aframax sector.  Once again this market 
proved to be the least volatile of all the tanker markets both with actual fluctuations 
which were $4,701 per day and as a percentage of the mean which stood at 25%.  
This proved to be a steadier market compared to the others, especially when taking 
into consideration that the market’s earning range was much narrower than that of 
the Suezmax sector and that the market nadir was equivalent to that of the Suezmax 
market, at $11,000 per day.  Average earnings for the entire period under analysis 
stood at $18,774. 
The most interesting details from analysing the one-year time charter earnings of the 
various tanker sectors emerge from the products tanker sector.  Like with the other 
three sectors, the range of earnings increased, dipping to $9,000 per day and rising to 
$27,250 per day.  However, with regard to the actual fluctuation of earnings, the 
products sector was more volatile than the Aframax market, with a standard 
deviation of $5,118 per day.  Even more importantly, as a percentage of the average 
earnings for the entire period, which was $14,881, the products tanker market proved 
to be the most volatile of all sectors. 
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Tanker Spot Market Earnings 
 
Figure 2.6 Tanker Spot Charter Rates, 1991-2009 
Source: Author and Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Table 2.8 Summary Statistics of Spot Charter Rates for Tanker Vessels. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
$/day 
Standard Deviation 
  $/day         % mean 
VLCC 38,995 29,674 76% 
Suezmax 31,624 22,105 70% 
Aframax 25,524 14,999 59% 
Product 17,508 9,299 53% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
Spot earnings over the last two decades were the most representative of traditional 
views of the various shipping sectors.  As is expected, the range of earnings 
increased across the board, with the three largest tanker sectors increasing the range 
more than three-fold.  Furthermore, peak earnings for all but the products tanker 
market more than doubled when compared to the peak earnings in the one-year time-
charter earnings and all markets reached lower depths.  Further, average earnings for 
the period between January 1990 and May 2009 increased in all sectors. 
It could be concluded that in the spot market, the four tanker markets are the most 
clearly delineated and the most structured; the earnings of the bigger vessels reached 
heights that the smaller vessels did not, while the smaller vessels reached low points 
that were not experienced by the larger vessels.  Finally, a substantial increase in 
volatility can be noted it all sectors, but for the first time, volatility increased with the 
size of vessels without exception. 
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At times, the VLCC market reached exorbitant levels of $185,964 per day but also 
experienced lows of $8,478 per day.  The sector volatility also increased 
substantially to $29,674 per day, rising to 76% of the total average – more than 
double that of one-year time charters.  Despite earnings reaching $185,964 there was 
a 99% chance that earnings would not exceed $128,017 per day. 
The standard deviation in the Suezmax market also rose substantially; more than 
doubling when compared to longer term contracts; however, not to the extent seen in 
the VLCC market.  At 70% of the total mean, the standard deviation for this market 
was $22,105 per day. 
The same situation could be seen in the Aframax market.  Losing its status as the 
least volatile market in the tanker sector, the standard deviation more than doubled, 
up to 59% of the overall mean which was $25,524. 
The only real changes compared to longer term charters were in fact witnessed in the 
products tanker sectors.  The smallest increase, both with regard to range of earnings, 
overall average and peak earnings was seen in this market.  Furthermore, from being 
the most volatile market, it became the least volatile with a standard deviation of 
$9,299 per day, that is, 53% of the overall mean of $17,508.  
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Chapter 3. Assessment of Dry Bulk and Tanker 
Market Earnings using Portfolio Theory 
As stated previously, cycles are an inherent feature of shipping markets. Amongst all 
tools available to reduce volatility, this chapter investigates to which extent the 
Portfolio Theory could be used to identify the optimal strategy of shipowners 
operating in bulk and tanker markets or in both markets at the same time. To do so, a 
first section briefly presents the portfolio theory focusing on the elements to consider 
when selecting the relevant investment to include within a portfolio. Section 3.2 will 
apply the Portfolio Theory to earnings in dry bulk market and section 3.3 to tanker 
markets. Finally, section 3.4 presents an analysis of bulk and tanker markets all 
together.  
Furthermore, and for the different markets (bulk and tanker), the analysis will 
differentiate according to the length of time of the contract under which vessels are 
employed. This approach was selected considering that in shipping different options 
exist such as diversifying one’s portfolio by investing in both the dry bulk sector as 
well as the tanker sector. Furthermore, the distinction in the period of time for which 
a vessel is chartered has an impact on both freight and on the volatility of these 
earnings, and could also represent another potential strategy of diversification.  
3.1 Portfolio Theory 
The Portfolio Theory, also referred to as the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), relies 
on the principle that risk can be reduced through diversification (investing in 
different projects), as long as the various projects have some specific characteristics 
(Cariou, 2009). These characteristics refer not only to how these investments perform 
in isolation but also to how they interact with one another. 
When it comes to the performance of a specific investment in isolation, two 
parameters are to be used: firstly, the average returns of an asset and the standard 
deviation of returns that capture the level of risk. According to this theory, a risk 
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adverse investor would secure the highest possible return for a given level of risk or 
the least possible risk for a given level of return (Scott, 2003). 
When it comes to the performance of a portfolio made from the combination of 
various assets, three main elements are to be considered: firstly, the respective 
returns and standard deviation of each individual asset; secondly, the share of 
investment in the respective investment (x% and (1-x)%) and finally, the 
interrelation between the various assets which is captured by the correlation 
coefficient. For instance, and in the case of a two assets portfolio (A and B), the 
expected return E(rp) and standard deviation (or variance) of a portfolio P is: 
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It appears that the average return of a portfolio is the weighted expected return from 
each individual asset, and the portfolio variance will be equal to the square of the 
total weighted sum of the individual asset volatilities (Armbruster, 2009). The 
correlation coefficient between the two assets (p) which reflects the strength of the 
linear relation between two variables and can take any value between -1 and +1 is a 
crucial element to estimate the volatility (risk) of the portfolio. The smaller the 
correlation coefficient, the smaller the last term is and therefore the standard 
deviation (the risk). It can even lead to a negative contribution to risk when p<0 
(Cariou, 2009).  
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the importance of this last element (p) in selecting 
assets to build a portfolio. As two assets with a correlation of 1 would effectively 
move in lockstep (perfect substitutes), it would not make sense to hold them both in 
the same portfolio. The returns would offset each other, thereby amounting to zero. 
While this is an oversimplification of the concept (as no assets would exactly move 
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the same way), it illustrates the case that generally it would not make sense to add 
securities which are perfectly correlated in the same portfolio.   
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 Figure 3.1 Two-Asset Portfolio with p= +1 
 Source: Prof. Cariou 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the situation of perfect negative correlation for which, although 
the expected return is similar than in former case, the portfolio risk is then reduced to 
0. 
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Figure 3.2 Two-Asset Portfolio with p= -1 
Source: Prof. Cariou 
To conclude from this brief overview of the Portfolio Theory, it appears that the 
volatility in shipping could be reduced using findings from the Portfolio Theory, in 
selecting specific assets based on their respective characteristics (earnings, standard 
deviation) and on their interrelation (coefficient of correlation). Section 3.2 applies 
this risk management tool to the specific case of bulk markets, section 3.3 provides a 
similar approach for the tanker markets and section 3.4 combines both markets. 
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3.2 Application of Portfolio Theory to Dry Bulk Market 
As stated in section 3.1, the selection of assets to be included within a portfolio 
should be based on their respective characteristics (earnings and standard deviation 
from 2.1.1) and on their interrelation (coefficient of correlation). When focusing on 
bulk carriers and for various contract durations, it appears that the strength of the 
correlation between all the dry bulk sectors is overwhelming.  
The correlation between the Capesize market and the Handymax market, between the 
Capesize market and the Handysize market, and between the Handymax market and 
the Handysize market remained the strongest, regardless of the length of the 
charterparty.  On the other hand, the correlation between the Capesize market and the 
Panamax market, between the Panamax market and the Handysize market, and 
between the Panamax market and the Handysize market, was not as strong as the 
other markets in the three-year time charter earnings; however, they did show a 
tendency to strengthen as the time of the charterparty decreased. 
Table 3.1 Correlation Matrixes for Monthly Earnings of Dry Bulk Sectors for Different Charters, 
 1991-2009 
Earnings in $ for 3 year time charter 
 Capesize Panamax Handymax Handysize 
Capesize 100%    
Panamax 95% 100%   
Handymax 98% 95% 100%  
Handysize 98% 93% 99% 100% 
Earnings in $ for 1 year time charter 
 Capesize Panamax Handymax Handysize 
Capesize 100%    
Panamax 98% 100%   
Handymax 99% 97% 100%  
Handysize 99% 96% 99% 100% 
Earnings in $ for the spot market  
 Capesize Panamax Handymax Handysize 
Capesize 100%    
Panamax 99% 100%   
Handymax 98% 99% 100%  
Handysize 97% 98% 99% 100% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
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Looking first at the three-year time charterparties the correlation between the 
Panamax earnings and the Handysize earnings was the weakest, thereby indicating 
the best combination for reducing risk.  However, after assuming an investment in 
these two vessels (complete results in Annex A), it emerges that as a portfolio they 
would not produce the best results.  The expected return for this investment is 
$11,091 with a standard deviation of $6,242.  In fact, the best result is produced by a 
combination of Handymax and Handysize vessels, with an expected return of 
$11,267 and a standard deviation of $5,924.  As a percentage of the expected returns, 
the standard deviation is 53%.  Therefore, although the Panamax-Handysize 
combination produces the weakest correlation, the results from the portfolio test 
indicate that expected returns would be less and standard deviation higher than the 
best results from the portfolio test. The combination that fared the worst was that of a 
Capesize and Panamax vessel.  Although the correlation between these two vessels is 
not the strongest, as a portfolio, it has an expected return of $18,123 and a standard 
deviation of $13,091, that is, 72% of the expected returns. 
For the one-year time charter earnings, the most favourable correlation is between a 
Panamax vessel and a Handysize vessel at 96%. However, different results are 
produced when applying the portfolio theory.  As with the longer term charterparties, 
a Handymax-Handysize combination proves to be the safest investment, with an 
expected return of $12,936 and a standard deviation of $9,643, that is, 75% of the 
expected return.  On the other hand, the most discouraging results produced were 
when the portfolio test was applied to the Capesize-Panamax combination.  Although 
it produces the highest expected returns of $21,827, the standard deviation is also 
high at $20,254. 
Finally, when comparing the spot market to the one-year time charter market, the 
only change emerges from the results of the market correlations.  A Capesize-
Handysize investment produced the weakest correlation; however, the result from the 
portfolio test produces one of the worst results with a standard deviation of 95% of 
the expected return.  The results from a Capesize-Panamax combination produced 
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the worst results again, with an expected return of $23,833 and a standard deviation 
of $23,658, an incredible 99% of the expected returns.  Once again the best results 
were produced by a Handymax-Handysize investment.  Although the expected 
returns were the lowest of all sectors at $12,915, so was the standard deviation at 
77% of expected earnings. 
To conclude, the investigation of the characteristics of investment performance 
(earnings) for dry bulk vessels and for various contract duration suggests that the 
high level of correlation between all earnings (the minimum is found to be equal to 
93%) would not leave much room for differentiation. It therefore suggests that faced 
with an unexpected decrease in the market conditions, such as the current financial 
crisis, one could expect operators specialised in these markets to be highly affected. 
This includes not only specialised carriers focusing on one market (for instance 
Capesize and Spot) but also diversified operators in bulk (for instance Capesize and 
Handymax) as these markets are highly correlated.  
3.3 Application of Portfolio Theory to Tanker Markets 
In determining which tanker assets form the most suitable portfolio, the same criteria 
as applied to the dry bulk portfolios are assessed.  That is, earnings and standard 
deviation of the various tanker markets (from section 2.2.1) and on their interrelation 
(coefficient of correlation).  As with the dry bulk market, following an analysis of the 
correlations of the tanker markets in the three types of charters, the portfolio theory 
would be applied in order to strengthen or detract from initial results.   
It is immediately apparent that the correlations between the different tanker markets 
are not as strong as those seen in the dry bulk market and the combination of tanker 
markets produced a wider range of correlation strengths.  Upon further scrutiny, it 
emerges that as the period of the charter decreases, the correlation between the tanker 
markets strengthens.  This is a common trend that is shared with the various dry bulk 
markets. 
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Table 3.2 Correlation Matrixes for Monthly Earnings of Tanker Sectors for Different Charters, 
 1991-2009 
Earnings in $ for 3 year time charter 
 VLCC Suezmax Aframax Products 
VLCC 100%    
Suezmax 81% 100%   
Aframax 75% 86% 100%  
Products 62% 48% 42% 100% 
Earnings in $ for 1 year time charter 
 VLCC Suezmax Aframax Products 
VLCC 100%    
Suezmax 91% 100%   
Aframax 86% 94% 100%  
Products 78% 76% 79% 100% 
Earnings in $ for the spot market 
 VLCC Suezmax Aframax Products 
VLCC 100%    
Suezmax 94% 100%   
Aframax 88% 96% 100%  
Products 74% 81% 87% 100% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
From the tanker earnings of a three-year time charter it is clear that the weakest 
correlation in the three-year time charter tanker market is between the earnings of an 
Aframax tanker and a Products tanker.  Therefore, in theory, these two vessels as a 
portfolio would reduce the volatility of their earnings.  However, the results of the 
portfolio tests differ slightly.  The Aframax-Products Portfolio (complete results in 
Annex A) has an expected return of $16,405 with a standard deviation of $2,438 per 
day, while the optimal combination would produce returns of $25,411 per day with a 
standard deviation of $3,666 per day – a mere 14% of the expected earnings.  This is 
for a VLCC-Aframax portfolio, which have a substantially stronger correlation.  
What is even more encouraging about this particular portfolio is that it has the 
second highest expected returns with the second lowest standard deviation.   
The least favourable portfolio was that of a Suezmax-Products combination, with an 
expected return of $18,547 per day and a standard deviation of $3,392 per day.  This 
result stands out as the correlation between these two tanker earnings is one of the 
weakest, yet as part of a portfolio they have a volatility of 18% of the earnings.   
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The remaining three market combinations all have a standard deviation, which is 
17% of the expected return.  It is worth mentioning that for all possible portfolios, 
the standard deviations as a percentage of expected earnings are relatively small and 
only range between 14% and 18%, resulting in a similar volatility.  Furthermore, the 
volatility of the various tanker portfolios pales in comparison to the substantial 
volatility in the dry bulk portfolios for three-year time charters. 
A slight difference in the one-year time charters is that the Suezmax earnings and the 
Products earnings had the lowest correlation.  Theoretically, these two assets should 
form the least volatile portfolio.  However, from the results of the portfolio it 
transpires that this is the least favourable portfolio.  Along with another two 
portfolios, it has the highest standard deviation as a percentage of the expected 
earnings at 32%. Worse still, of the three portfolios it has the lowest expected 
earnings.  Despite being the least favourable portfolio again, it can be said that the 
volatility for this portfolio did not increase as rapidly as the other portfolios as the 
time of the charter decreased.  
On the other hand, the strongest correlation was between the earnings in the 
Suezmax and Aframax markets, and this portfolio faired modestly well with a 
standard deviation of 29% of the expected earnings. 
Finally, the results of the portfolio test reveal that the most favourable investment 
would be in a portfolio containing an Aframax tanker and a Products tanker.  
Although this portfolio does have the lowest earnings per day of $16,828, it also has 
the lowest standard deviation at $4,637 per day, that is, 28% of the expected returns. 
Similar to the results in the three-year time charters, these results reveal quite a 
narrow range of standard deviation as a percentage of earnings, for all the portfolios, 
ranging from 28%-32%.  Like-for-like, there was a substantial increase in volatility 
in all portfolios when compared to the three-year time charter counterparts.   
Finally, when analysing the results of the spot market portfolios, two categories are 
created.  On the one side, there are two portfolios, namely a VLCC-Products 
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combination and a VLCC-Aframax combination, which have a standard deviation of 
less than 70% of the earnings.  The VLCC-Products correlation was the weakest at 
74% and this result shone through the results of the portfolio test.  The portfolio had 
an expected return of $28,251 per day with a standard deviation of $18,492 per day.  
This portfolio has the second highest expected earnings with one of the lowest 
volatilities resulting in a standard deviation of 65% of the expected earnings.  This is 
more than double that of its one-year time charter equivalent, but nonetheless, the 
lowest increase in volatility of all portfolios.  This emphasises the incredible increase 
in volatility that earnings experience on the spot market. 
On the other hand, the four other possible portfolios saw volatility increase more 
than three-fold.  Standard deviation as a percentage of expected earnings was above 
95% for all portfolios, the worst being 99% for a Suezmax-Aframax investment.  
This result is also in line with the correlation between the two sector earnings, which 
was the highest at 96%.  Returns for this portfolio were $18,512 per day with a 
standard deviation of $18,322 per day. 
3.4 Application of Portfolio Theory to Dry Bulk and Tanker 
Markets 
The same methodology that was applied to both the dry bulk and tanker sectors was 
used to analyse results of portfolios that combine vessels from both sectors.  
Following an analysis of all the sectors earnings and standard deviation and their 
interrelation, a common trend emerges.  The overall pattern is that the correlations 
strengthen as the time charter length decreases.   
However, a unique pattern emerges in correlations that include a Products tanker and 
any vessel from the dry bulk sector.  From Table 3.3 it is apparent that as the time 
charter period decreases, so does the correlation between Product tankers earnings 
and dry bulk vessels earnings. 
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Table 3.3 Correlation Matrix for Monthly Earnings of Shipping Market Sectors for Different 
 Charters, 1991-2009 
Earnings in $ for 3 year time charter 
 VLCC Suezmax Aframax Products 
Capesize 36% 10% 10% 68% 
Panamax 25% 1% 6% 56% 
Handymax 35% 11% 11% 73% 
Handysize 40% 14% 14% 77% 
Earnings in $ for 1 year time charter 
 VLCC Suezmax Aframax Products 
Capesize 61% 46% 46% 66% 
Panamax 50% 36% 37% 55% 
Handymax 60% 46% 47% 63% 
Handysize 62% 47% 48% 69% 
Spot Earnings in $ for the spot market 
 VLCC Suezmax Aframax Products 
Capesize 65% 64% 64% 55% 
Panamax 61% 61% 56% 52% 
Handymax 61% 61% 56% 53% 
Handysize 63% 62% 57% 53% 
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
The correlation between the Suezmax sector and the Panamax sector is clearly the 
weakest of all possible combinations and therefore the most viable risk-averse 
investment.  However, when put to the portfolio test (complete results in Annex A), 
this combination slips down the pecking order and is no longer the best option.  This 
portfolio gives an expected return of $17,152 per day with a standard deviation of 
$4,491 per day.  This is equivalent to a standard deviation of 26% of the expected 
earnings which, out of 16 possible portfolios, is the seventh most risk averse 
investment.   
The best portfolio is a combination of a VLCC tanker and a Handysize bulker.  This 
is an interesting result as these two vessels have a much stronger correlation 
compared to other combinations, but in fact only have the lowest volatility as a 
portfolio.  Expected earnings are $21,493 per day with a standard deviation of $4,255 
per day, that is, 20% of earnings. 
The riskiest investment is a Capesize-Products portfolio with a standard deviation of 
55% of expected earnings.  The standard deviation for such a portfolio is the highest 
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out of all portfolios, at $10,732 per day, while the expected return of $19,519 per day 
is not the best.  This result is more logical given the relatively high correlation 
between the two sectors, compared to other markets. 
An observation worth making is that the most risk averse portfolio includes the 
largest of tankers with the smallest of dry bulk vessels. The reverse is true for the 
least viable portfolio, which combines a Capesize with a products tanker.  
Earnings in the Panamax sector and the Suezmax sector had the weakest correlation 
at 36%, but as has often been the situation, this positive result does not make itself 
visible when applying the portfolio theory to this combination of vessels.  The 
expected return for this portfolio is $19,426 per day with a standard deviation of 
$8,862 per day. 
The results of applying the portfolio theory to the various combinations revealed that 
the most risk averse portfolio would include a Handysize dry bulker with an Aframax 
tanker.  The expected returns are $15,031 per day with a standard deviation of $5,533 
per day, the lowest of all portfolios.  This has the lowest risk as a percentage of the 
expected earnings, at 37%. 
Despite a weaker correlation between the Capesize sector and the Products tanker 
market, it remained the riskiest investment with a standard deviation of 73% of the 
expected returns, which were $21,820 per day. 
With regard to other portfolios that include a Products tanker, although correlations 
weakened as charter time decreased, the volatility of the actual portfolios increased.  
For example, while the correlation between the Panamax earnings and the Products 
earnings, decreased from 56% to 55%, the standard deviation as a percentage of 
expected earnings of the portfolio increased from 35%-56%.  However, the volatility 
did not increase as much as other portfolios. 
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The risk for the various portfolios for a one-year time charter increased across the 
board and ranged from 37%-73% of expected earnings.  This compares to a range of 
between 20% and 55% of the expected earnings for the three-year time charters. 
For the spot market portfolios, the weakening of correlations between Product 
tankers and vessels from the dry bulk sector had a positive effect on the results of the 
portfolio tests.  The Panamax-Products portfolio became the fifth most viable 
investment along with Handysize-Products portfolio with a standard deviation of 
55% of the expected earnings.  The Handymax-Products portfolio fared even better, 
along with the Handysize-Aframax portfolio, it has a volatility of 57% compared to 
the expected earnings.  Therefore, with an expected return of $16,049 per day and a 
standard deviation of $9,077 per day, it became the second least volatile portfolio.  
Better still, a portfolio that includes a Handysize bulker and a Products tanker was 
the safest portfolio with an expected return of $14,372 per day and a standard 
deviation of $7,843 per day. 
The riskiest portfolio was that which included a Capesize bulker and a Suezmax 
tanker, with a standard deviation of 78% of the $31,056 per day, expected earnings. 
The spot market risk for the various tanker portfolios ranged from 55%-78% of the 
expected earnings.  This is a substantial increase in risk when viewed in comparison 
to the one-year time charter volatility, which ranged from 37%-73% of expected 
earnings. 
3.5 Results 
The results from applying the portfolio theory (Annex A) to an array of vessel 
combinations produce varying results, favouring certain portfolios over others 
according to the length of the charterparty. 
Table 3.4 Asset Portfolios with the Lowest % StD for Different Time Charters. 
Portfolio Theory – Three Year Time Charter 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
VLCC 50% 25,411 13,440,506 3,666 14% 
Aframax 50%         
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Portfolio Theory – One Year Time Charter 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Aframax 50% 16,828 21,497,858 4,637 28% 
Products 50%         
Portfolio Theory – Spot Market 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Handysize 50% 14,374 61,512,728 7,843 55% 
Products 50%         
Notes: Sample covers December 1991 to May 2009 (Monthly Data) 
Source: Data from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network 
Calculations: Author 
With regards to the three-year time charters, a portfolio consisting only of tankers, 
that is, a VLCC and an Aframax, would produce the least volatility; this even when 
compared to the least volatile portfolios of purely dry bulk vessels or portfolios that 
include one dry bulker and one tanker. 
When dealing with one-year time charters, the most risk averse portfolio is once 
again that which includes two tankers.  A portfolio of an Aframax and a Products 
tanker would produce a standard deviation of 28% of expected earnings.  Putting this 
into perspective, a Handysize-Aframax portfolio has a standard deviation of 37% of 
earnings, while a Handymax-Handysize portfolio has a staggering volatility of 75% 
of expected returns. 
The scenario changes slightly when operating vessels purely on the spot market.  The 
least volatile portfolio would then be one that involves both a dry bulker and a 
tanker.  A portfolio that includes a Handysize bulker and a Products tanker would 
have a standard deviation of 55% of expected earnings.  This is nonetheless a high 
degree of volatility, but fares much better then portfolios that include only tankers or 
dry bulker portfolios.  A VLCC-Products portfolio has a standard deviation of 65% 
of expected returns compared to a Handymax-Handysize portfolio that has a standard 
deviation of 77% of expected earnings. 

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Chapter 4. Assessment of Dry Bulk and Tanker 
Companies’ Earnings using Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The previous chapter applied the portfolio theory to understand the observed returns 
(earnings) on the dry bulk and tanker markets.  Earnings were expressed for various 
categories of vessels and the contract duration.  One of the main conclusions was that 
due to market characteristics, dry bulk markets in comparison with tanker markets 
would generate more earnings for two reasons: not only individual earnings are more 
volatile (for instance Capesize in comparison with VLCC), but the various earnings 
within a market are also more correlated (for instance between Capesize and 
Handymax for dry bulk vessels), not leaving much room for diversification.  
This chapter will look at a similar issue (understanding earnings), but focusing this 
time on earnings at a company level, in terms of share value of 21 shipping 
companies listed on different stock markets.  To analyse these specific returns, 
findings from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and more specifically the 
identification of the Beta-values, which are derived from the Portfolio Theory, will 
be used.  This beta-value is particularly suitable to understand the return of securities 
and will be briefly presented in section 4.1. A second section will present the 
characteristics together with some descriptive statistics of 21 listed companies that 
adopted a specialised or diversified shipping strategy.  The last three sections present 
estimates on beta-value and the CAPM model and discuss the results.  
 Capital Asset Pricing Model Methodology
The Capital Asset Pricing Model is an extension of the Portfolio Theory and it has 
been specifically used to understand the return of companies listed on stock markets 
(securities).  The idea is to consider that apart from elements already considered 
within the Portfolio Theory (earning, standard deviation for volatility and correlation 
coefficient with other alternative projects), other elements should be considered to 
take into account alternative investments available on the stock markets: risk-free 
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assets, such as treasury bonds for instance, and all other assets that are synthesised by 
the stock exchange index.  
It means that the return r from an asset j (rj) is at a minimum equal to rf (risk free 
asset) and can be more or less than other assets on the market [(E(rM)-Rf)] according 
to the Beta-value of a company j.  The beta-value depends on the total risk for this 
asset (capture by the standard deviation j), the risk on the market (M) and on the 
correlation coefficient between the asset j and the market M (pjM)1 so that:  
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The beta-value is known as the systematic risk and captures the part of the total risk 
(j) that cannot be reduced through diversification.  In other words, the CAPM states 
that to understand the return of a company, the average and standard deviation is not 
enough as long as within the standard deviation, a part can be eliminated in investing 
in other assets available in the market.  It means that an investor needs then to be 
compensated in two ways: time value of money – the risk-free asset (rf) and a 
compensation the investor needs for taking on additional risk (Morgenson & Harvey, 
2002). 
 
Figure 4.1 Security Market Line 
Source: EDinformatics 
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1
 The CAPM as presented here relies on various restricted assumptions namely that all investors aim 
to maximize economic utility and: are rational and risk-averse; are price takers, i.e., they cannot 
influence prices; can lend and borrow unlimitedly under the risk free rate of interest; trade without 
transaction or taxation costs; deal with securities that are all highly divisible into small parcels; 
assume all information is at the same time available to all investors; measure risk by standard 
deviation; have a single-period investment time horizon and all have the same expectation. 
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By definition, the market itself has an underlying beta of 1.0, and individual stocks 
are ranked according to how much they deviate from the market.  A stock that is 
more volatile than the market over time, has a beta whose absolute value is above 
1.0.  On the other hand, if a stock moves less than the market, the absolute value of 
the stock's beta is less than 1.0 (McClure, 2009).  As an example, a stock that has a 
beta of 2 follows the market in an overall decline or growth, but does so by a factor 
of 2; meaning when the market has an overall decline of 3% a stock with a beta of 2 
will fall 6%.  Betas can also be negative, meaning the stock moves in the opposite 
direction of the market: a stock with a beta of -3 would decline 9% when the market 
goes up 3% and conversely would climb 9% if the market fell by 3%. 
As a result, it can be concluded, and this applies to rises and falls, that high beta 
shares (beta >1) are more volatile and are therefore considered to be riskier, but are 
in turn supposed to provide a potential for higher returns.  Low beta shares (beta <1) 
are less risky but tend to underperform the return on the market portfolio (Cariou, 
2009). 
The systematic risk is caused by factors that affect the prices of virtually all 
securities, although in different proportions (e.g. changes in interest rates, consumer 
prices, etc.), and can be related to three main determinants: 
1. The sensitivity of the company’s revenues to the general level of economic 
activity and other macro-economic factors; 
2. The proportion of fixed to variable costs; and 
3. The level of financial gearing and leverage, that is, the amount of interest bearing 
debt compared to shareholders equity (Cariou, 2009). 
On the other hand, unsystematic risk is a risk specific to an industry or firm (e.g. 
losses caused by labour problems, weather conditions, etc.) and can be reduced by 
assembling a portfolio with significant diversification so that a single event affects 
only a limited number of the assets (Scott, 2003). 
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To conclude, the main addition from the CAPM to the portfolio theory is to suggest 
that instead of focusing on the relationship between two projects for instance 
Capesize versus Handymax (as it was done in the previous chapter when dealing 
with various earnings on bulk markets), the return for a specific security j should be 
assessed in comparison with all other assets on the stock market.  The next sections 
will apply such methodology in providing first a descriptive analysis of the 
characteristics and returns of 21 listed shipping companies in bulk and tanker 
markets that were selected  (section 4.2), and then, in estimating the beta-value of 
these companies. 
 Descriptive Statistics of Dry Bulk and Tanker Companies 
A total of 21 shipping companies have been selected and are listed on five different 
stock exchanges in Europe and the United Stated of America.  These companies have 
been chosen as they are mainly active in shipping and they have developed different 
strategies over the years (specialisation versus diversification).  The results could 
then be related to the analysis carried out in Chapter 3, stressing that it can be 
expected that a company specialised in dry bulk activities should be subject to more 
earnings and exposed to more risk (standard deviation in earnings), the latter being 
mainly systematic (beta-value).  
The earnings for these companies are based on the average of their weekly share 
prices from December 2005 to June 2009 (186 observations).  December 2005 was 
selected for reason of consistency when comparing different companies and knowing 
that it is the earliest date for which the share prices are available for all the 21 
companies.  In order to compare the various share prices, data were transformed 
using an index value based on 100 for December 2005.  Creating the index was 
imperative as stock exchange markets operate in different currencies and to convert 
share prices into one currency would have created the problem of then having to 
factor in the weekly average exchange rates for each currency and inflation. 
The discussion on the 21 different shipping companies selected will be done in 
grouping them according to the markets on which they are listed.  Five different 
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markets were used to retrieve the share value of shipping companies: NASDAQ (4 
companies) and NYSE (7) for New York, OSL (4) in Oslo, CSE (4) in Copenhagen 
and EURONEXT (2) in Bruxelles/Paris/Amsterdam.   
Starting with companies listed on the NASDAQ, 4 companies were selected: Golar 
LNG Ltd, DryShips Inc., TopShips Inc. and FreeSeas Inc. (see Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2 NASDAQ Share Listed Companies, 2005-2009 
Source: Author and Google Finance 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of NASDAQ Share Listed Companies. 
Company Mean 
points/week 
Standard Deviation 
points/day % mean 
Golar LNG Ltd 107 39 36% 
DryShips Inc. 287 255 89% 
TopShips Inc. 36 28 78% 
FreeSeas Inc. 105 45 43% 
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author  
DryShips Inc. has the most imposing figures both in terms of earnings (287 point), 
and consequently as expected in terms of % of standard deviation to mean ratio 
(89%). DryShips Inc. also had the highest mean, more than twice that of Golar LNG 
Ltd. and Free Seas Inc.; this result is mainly explained by performances during 2007 
and 2008 that proved to be a bumper year with the share index value reaching 982, 
more than four times the highest value of FreeSeas Inc. This volatility showed 
statistically, as based on the mean earnings plus three standard deviations, 99% of the 
time share value would not exceed 872 points. 
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A further investigation on the characteristics of DryShips Inc. stresses that the 
company owns, through its subsidiaries, a fleet of 37 dry bulk carriers amongst 
which seven are Capesize vessels, 14 Panamax and three Supramax, totalling over 
three million deadweight tons (DryShips Inc., 2009).  The company has diversified 
slightly through its subsidiaries, which own and operate two ultra-deep water, harsh 
environment, semi-submersible drilling rigs (Thomson Reuters, 2009).  
The company employs its dry bulk vessels under period time charters, on bareboat 
charters, in the spot charter market and in dry bulk carrier pools, which combine spot 
market voyages, time charters and contracts of affreightment with freight forward 
agreements for hedging purposes and to perform vessel scheduling (DryShips Inc., 
2009).  
Golar LNG proved to have the lowest standard deviation as a percentage of the mean 
index value, at 36%.  Furthermore, the company proved to be fairly stable over the 
three and a half years, whilst still benefitting from the market boom throughout 2007 
and 2008.  The mean value of 107 was also more representative of the range of the 
index value which fell to 22 and rose to 196.  The company is engaged in the 
acquisition, ownership, operation, and chartering of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 
carriers, Floating Storage Re-gasification Units (FSRU) and Floating Power 
Generation Plant (FPGP) through its subsidiaries, and the development of 
liquefaction projects.  On July 10th 2009, the company’s fleet consisted of 13 vessels 
and a 50% equity interest in a LNG carrier.  Vessels are contracted under long-term 
charters and medium-term, five-year market related charter contracts with Shell.  The 
Golar Mazo, which is jointly owned with the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, is 
under an 18 year time charter that expires in 2017 (Thomson Reuters, 2009). 
TopShips Inc. is worth mentioning, and not for the best of reasons.  The mean value 
was considerably lower than the other companies, yet the company still experienced 
a 78% standard deviation.  More importantly, while all other companies took 
advantage of the recent super-cycle which translated in higher stock value, TopShips 
Inc.’s share value showed a steady decline from 2007 to 2009. 
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This is a relatively diversified shipping company, operating in the two bulk 
segments: tanker and dry bulk.  As of July 27, 2009, the company’s fleet consisted of 
18 vessels: three Panamaxes, two Handymaxes and eleven Products, with a total 
carrying capacity of over 0.8 million dwt (Thomson Reuters, 2009).  The Product 
tankers are normally chartered to carry refined petroleum products or crude oil but 
are geared to transport chemicals also (TOP Ships Inc., 2008). 
In order to optimise return on investments their strategy claims to be focused on 
diversification of their fleet by sector and size segments.  Their fleet deployment 
strategy includes a mix of both period time charters and spot market voyage charters 
(TOP Ships Inc., 2008). 
Finally, FreeSeas Inc. specialises in the dry bulk sector, operating nine vessels 
through wholly owned subsidiaries.   The company focuses on the Handysize and 
Handymax sectors with an aggregate dwt tons of approximately 268,166 (Thomson 
Reuters, 2009). FreeSeas employs its vessels in a combination of spot charter market, 
period time charters and in dry bulk carrier pools and this varies in order to create a 
balance between a predictable cash flow while also trying to maximise profits during 
cyclical booms (Free Seas Inc., 2009).  Free Seas Inc. shares had a mean of 105 
points, higher than that of TopShips over the last three and a half years.  Share value 
peaked in 2007, in line with many shipping companies as the BDI was booming. 
Turning to NYSE, seven shipping companies were selected.  Figure 4.3 represents 
the development in their share value from December 2005 to July 2009, while Table 
4.2 presents their performance in terms of mean value of index (base 100 in 
December 2005), standard deviation and % of standard deviation to mean value. 
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Figure 4.3 NYSE Share Listed Companies, 2005-2009 
Source: Author and Google Finance 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of NYSE share listed companies. 
Company 
 
Mean 
points/day 
Standard Deviation 
 points/day  % mean 
Excel Maritime 175 127 73% 
Overseas Hlding 113 31 27% 
Teekay Corp. 93 32 34% 
Kirby Corp. 140 32 23% 
Tsakos Energy 133 37 28% 
Nordic American 108 13 12% 
Frontline Ltd. 96 27 28% 
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd. specialises in owning and operating dry bulk cargo 
vessels worldwide.  As of 16th June 2009, the company’s fleet totalled 47 vessels, 
consisting of five Capesize, 14 Kamsarmax, 21 Panamax, two Supramax and five 
Handymax, with a total carrying capacity of approximately 3.9 million dwt tons.  
The employment strategy for the vessels is a combination of spot market fixtures and 
long term charters.  The large majority of vessels are fixed on long term charters and 
in recent years, some 17 vessels have been chartered to one single charterer and 
accounted for approximately 23% of Excel’s earnings in 2008 (Excel Maritime 
Carriers Ltd, 2005). 
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Throughout 2007 and 2008 Excel Maritime clearly outperformed the other selected 
shipping companies from the NYSE.  Throughout this two year boom Excel 
Maritime share value reached a peak of 615 points on the index, more than twice the 
peak Kirby Corporation reached throughout this period.  The mean value of Excel 
Maritime for the entire three and a half years was 175 points, well below the peak 
reached during the boom, which indicates that 2007 and 2008 was truly an 
extraordinary period for the company.   
However, Excel Maritime also had the highest standard deviation, which stood at 
75% of the mean.  To put this into perspective, the second most volatile company is 
Teekay Corporation which had a standard deviation of 34% of the mean – 
considerably lower than Excel Maritime.  Though, Teekay’s mean share average was 
also substantially lower at 93 index points. 
Teekay Corporation is quite different to Excel Maritime, both with regard to the 
shipping sectors in which it operates and the shipping strategy utilised.  The 
company provides marine services to the oil and gas companies, helping them link 
their upstream energy production to their downstream processing operations. It 
operates in four business segments: offshore segment, liquefied gas segment, spot 
tanker segment and fixed-rate tanker segment.  As of August 2009, Teekay had a 
total fleet of 169, which includes managed vessels.  This includes one VLCC, 28 
Suezmaxes, 50 Aframaxes, 13 Product tankers, 40 Shuttle tankers, six Liquid 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) carriers, 19 LNG carriers, five Floating Production, Storage 
and Offloading (FPSO) units and five Floating Storage and Off-take (FSO) units 
(Teekay Corporation, 2009).  Teekay also jointly owns with A/S Dampskibsselskabet 
TORM, OMI Corporation, an international owner and operator of tankers. 
Teekay fixes its various crude oil tankers and product carriers on a spot-market basis 
or short-term, fixed rate contracts (contracts with an initial term of less than three 
years) and on long-term, fixed-rate, time charter contracts.  Some of these vessels 
also form part of three pools, which are either solely or jointly managed by Teekay.  
The company earnings for 2007 put the importance of each sector into perspective.  
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The offshore segment accounted for approximately 47% of net revenues; 9% from 
liquefied gas segment; 34% from the spot tanker segment and 10% from the fixed-
rate tanker segment (Thomson Reuters, 2009). 
The least volatile of all the 21 companies is Nordic American Tanker Shipping 
Limited with only 12% volatility when compared to the mean share value.  The share 
index produces some interesting results which justify the stability of the company’s 
value.  While the share price never reached the peaks reached by the other 
companies, neither did the shares dip to the low levels of the other companies.  This 
means that the company traded within the narrowest share value range of all the 
companies and that the mean value of 108 points is indicative of the overall value 
throughout the period.  The company is an international tanker company that owns 
and operates a fleet of double-hull Suezmax tankers averaging approximately 
155,000 dwt tons each.  As of 27th July 2009, the company owned 13 tankers with a 
chartering policy that has certain ships on the spot market and others fixed for long 
term charters, usually to oil majors (Nordic American Tanker Shipping, 2009). 
The remaining four listed companies showed similar activity throughout the period 
under scrutiny.  All experienced a standard deviation of between 23%-27% of the 
respective companies’ mean, which ranged from 96 to 140 points.  These companies 
all had relatively similar shipping strategies, spreading out assets within the overall 
tanker sector.  Kirby Corporation is worth mentioning, for the highest mean of this 
cluster of companies with the lowest standard deviation.  An explanation for the 
company’s good performance is that it has business interests outside marine 
transportation services. 
The company’s diesel engine services segment is engaged in the overhaul and repair 
of medium-speed and high-speed diesel engines and reduction gears, and related 
parts sales through Kirby Engine Systems, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
company. 
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In the shipping branch of the company, their strategy focuses on inland transportation 
of petrochemicals, black oil products and agricultural chemicals by tank barges, 
which require some highly specialised vessels and the offshore transportation of dry 
bulk cargoes by barge.  The following is Kirby Corp.’s fleet as of February 2009: 
914 active inland tank barges and four offshore dry cargo barges which provide the 
freight services and 234 active inland towboats, four offshore tugboats and one 
offshore shifting tugboat provide the power source.  With regards the tank barges, 
868 are owned by the company and 46 leased (Thomson Reuters, 2009). 
Tsakos Energy Navigation Limited provides international seaborne transportation of 
crude oil, petroleum products and also LNG.  Through its subsidiaries, the company 
owns a fleet of 46 double-hull tankers and one LNG.  Three VLCCs, ten Suezmaxes 
and eight Aframaxes are dedicated to the transportation of crude oil, while three 
Aframaxes, thirteen Panamaxes and eight Products tankers are involved in the 
clean/products trade, approximately 4.9 million dwt and an average age of 6.3 years 
(Tsakos Energy Navigation Limited, 2009).  The company operates its vessels 
worldwide, for national and other independent oil companies and refineries under 
long, medium and short-term charters (Thomson Reuters, 2009).  
Frontline Limited’s core business is the ownership and operation of vessels within 
the two larger tanker markets and oil/bulk/ore (OBO) carriers.  The company makes 
use of different financing mechanisms to ensure fleet growth and also charters in 
vessels and commercially manages vessels for third parties.  As of August 2009 
Frontline’s fleet therefore included, 46 VLCCs, 30 Suezmaxes and 8 OBOs 
(Frontline, 2009). 
With regard to their shipping strategy, the company fixes its vessels on the spot 
market, time charters of varying length and Contracts of Affreightment (COA) 
(Thomson Reuters, 2009).   
Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. is a bulk shipping company engaged primarily in 
the ocean transportation of crude oil and petroleum products. As of 30th April 2009, 
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the company owned and operated 120 vessels.  98 of these vessels are spread out 
over all tanker sectors, FSO units and LNG carriers, which are operated in the 
international market.  Another 22 vessels are operated in the United States Flag 
market (Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., 2009).  Overseas’ vessel operations are 
organized into business units and focused on market segments, each of which serves 
crude oil, refined petroleum products, United States Flag vessels and gas. The 
company employs a portfolio mix of owned and chartered-in vessels, and fixes them 
on spot and time charters based on market dynamics and contributes to various 
tanker pools (Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., 2009). 
 
Figure 4.4 OSL Share Listed Companies, 2005-2009 
Source: Author and Google Finance 
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of OSL share listed companies. 
Company Mean 
points/day 
Standard Deviation 
 points/day  % mean 
Bonheur ASA 145 46 32% 
Stolt Nielsen SA 60 23 38% 
Golden Ocean 397 313 79% 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 84 26 31% 
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
Golden Ocean Group Limited is primarily involved in the ownership and operation 
of dry bulk vessels.  The company owns ten Capesizes, ten Panamaxes and eleven 
Kamsarmaxes.  The fleet is further supplemented by one Capesize, 13 Panamaxes 
and one Kamsarmax, which are either chartered in on a minimum of three months or 
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on bareboat charter. Golden Ocean also commercially manages vessels for third 
parties and currently operates two Capesizes and eight OBOs, purely for dry cargo 
transportation (Golden Ocean Group Limited, 2009). 
As part of the company’s strategy, Golden Ocean uses a combination of spot market 
fixtures and period charters of varying lengths to maximise returns.  Forward freight 
agreements are traded for the purpose of managing exposure of vessels to spot 
market rates and for speculating.  It is also part of the company’s strategy to seek 
financing for vessels, which includes an attractive combination of debt and equity.  
Without a doubt Golden Ocean Group Limited is the company that performed the 
best throughout the period being analysed.  Barring a brief period in February 2009, 
from September 2006 through to June 2009 Golden Ocean share value was above 
that of the other three companies taken from the Oslo Stock Exchange.  Like many 
other shipping companies in the dry bulk sector, Golden Ocean experienced a 
massive boom throughout 2007 and 2008 as the super-cycle was in full swing. 
Throughout the last three and a half years Golden Ocean shares had a mean index 
value of 397 with a daily fluctuation of 313 points per day.  Therefore, with a 79% 
standard deviation of the mean, Golden Ocean was more than twice as volatile as any 
of the OSL listed companies.  However, the heights reached by Golden Ocean’s 
shares were also more than twice as high as those of the next highest, which were of 
Bonheur ASA. 
On the other hand, despite having a better mean value and reaching greater share 
values than Stolt Nielsen SA, Wilh Wilhelmsen ASA proved to be the least volatile 
investment throughout the entire period being analysed.  However, it is fair to say 
that Bonheur ASA, Stolt Nielsen SA and Wilh Wilhelmsen ASA could all be 
regarded as similar investments in this respect as the standard deviation for each 
company was between 31% and 38% of the mean value.  Even with regard to their 
company strategies, they have all opted for a highly diversified business portfolio 
with investments not exclusively kept to seaborne transportation. 
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Before going into Bonheur ASA’s share statistics, reference must be made to the 
rapid and brief spike in share value in the last week of May 2006, as this episode 
distorts the results slightly.  The only available reason for this irregular index activity 
is that Bonheur was planning two consecutive 4:1 stock splits, which were concluded 
within a week, when the share price dropped once again.  Bonheur ASA fared the 
best of the three companies, with a mean share index of 145 over the last three and a 
half years, with a standard deviation of 46 points.  Without this brief episode the 
range of share values would be much narrower with a lower standard deviation.   
Bonheur’s investments are largely carried out jointly with Ganger Rolf ASA and 
currently have direct or indirect ownership of Fred. Olsen Energy ASA (offshore 
drilling); Fred. Olsen Production ASA (floating production); Fred. Olsen Renewables 
AS (renewable energy); Fred. Olsen Cruise Lines Ltd. (cruise industry); First Olsen 
Ltd.; OceanLink Ltd. and Windcarrier AS (shipping).  Bonheur also has investments 
in media, property and fish farming.  The floating production and transportation 
services are focused on the tanker sector (Bonheur ASA, 2009). 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA is engaged in the provision of logistics solutions and 
maritime services internationally.  The company conducts industrial shipping 
activities, and is engaged in the transportation of rolling cargo.  Together with its 
partners, the group controls 160 car and roll-on, roll-off carriers, operating in a 
global network of trades (Thomson Reuters, 2009).  Vessels are deployed on 
predetermined routes or routes tailored to customers’ needs, which include 
manufacturers of cars, construction and agricultural machinery.  The vessels are 
either owned or chartered-in and deployed in the fleets operated by subsidiaries.  
Wilh. Wilhelmsen also offers on-land terminal and technical, inland transport 
procurement and supply chain management services (Wilh. Wilhelmsen, 2009). 
Finally, Stolt-Nielsen SA’s business interests include bitumen services, sea farms, 
tank containers, tankers and terminals. The tanker interests centre on the worldwide 
transportation, storage, and distribution of bulk liquid chemicals, edible oils, acids, 
and other specialty liquids (Thomson Reuters, 2009).  As of June 2009, Stolt Nielsen 
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fleet totalled 141 vessels, equivalent to more than 2.2 million dwt.  The fleet is 
employed on a combination of spot market fixtures, time charters and within pools 
(Stolt Nielsen SA, 2009). 
CSE Listed Companies 
 
Figure 4.5 CSE Share Listed Companies, 2005-2009 
Source: Author and Google Finance 
Table 4.4 Summary Statistics of CSE share listed companies. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
points/day 
Standard Deviation 
 points/day % mean 
A.P. Moller Maersk 82 20 24% 
D/S Norden 56 60 107% 
DFDS A/S 148 48 32% 
Torm A/S 81 38 47% 
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
What is impressive about these four shipping companies listed on the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange is that three of the companies share value fell below the one hundred 
point base rate during the height of the super-cycle.  A.P. Moller Maersk, D/S 
Norden and Torm A/S all began 2008 below the December 2005 value.  Throughout 
2006 and 2007 all four companies were on a steady recovery which was only 
sustained by DFDS A/S.  All four companies have adopted diversified shipping 
strategies, albeit to different extents. 
Without a doubt, A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S is probably the most widely diversified 
company of all with business interests in banks, airlines, retail services, steel yards, 
logistics services, which in all comprise approximately 1,100 companies in 130 
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countries.  Their maritime business interests are just as diversified, including marine 
transportation, oil production, terminals and shipbuilding (Thomson Reuters, 2009).   
Even when focusing purely on marine transportation, the same diversified strategy 
has been utilised.  Maersk Line, a fully owned subsidiary, is the largest individual 
owner and operator of container vessels, ranging from feeder size to the largest Post-
Panamax class in operation.  Other vessels that are owned and/or operated include 76 
tankers spread out over all sectors, 22 Gas Carriers and 5 LNG carriers.  Other 
subsidiaries own drillships, FPSOs and supply vessels (Maersk Tankers, 2009).  This 
diversification shone through the results as A.P. Moller Maersk proved to be the 
most stable of all with a standard deviation of 20 points per day and a mean value of 
82 points.  The company’s shares also traded within the narrowest range of the CSE 
listed companies reaching a low of 39 points and rising to 119 index points. 
Dampskibsselskabet Norden A/S and Torm A/S share some common elements in 
their shipping strategies.  They have both chosen to focus their business concerns on 
marine transportation and have chosen quite a diversified portfolio within this 
business sector.  Both companies own and/or operate vessels in both the dry bulk and 
tanker sectors and have also undertaken the same business strategy with regard to 
ownership of vessels and augmentation of the operating fleet. 
Norden A/S operates a fleet of 100 vessels comprising five Capesizes, 24 
Panamaxes, 34 Handymaxes, and 12 Handysizes in the dry bulk sector; and three 
Aframaxes and 30 Products in the tanker market (Dampskibsselskabet NORDEN 
A/S, 2009).  As can be seen the company has chosen a diversified size-segment 
strategy within both bulk sectors.  The core fleet is owned by the company and is 
further supplemented with long-term charters and short-term charters, as well as with 
vessels chartered for individual voyages.  The product tanker activities are operated 
through the Norient Product Pool, which is managed by the 50%-owned Norient 
Product Pool A/S (Thomson Reuters, 2009). 
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Despite this diversified strategy, the most drastic collapse is witnessed in this 
company’s share value, in April 2007, falling 200 points.  However, it must be noted 
that the company implemented a 20:1 stock split during this period, which is most 
probably the cause of this freefall.  Furthermore, this episode may have contributed 
to the company having the lowest mean value of all the CSE listed companies, while 
having an incredible standard deviation of 107%, making this company the most 
volatile in this respect. 
Torm A/S was another company that experienced a considerable drop, with a 49% 
decrease in share value in May 2007, decreasing from 165-85 index points.  Share 
value continued to decrease slightly for just over a year before another drop in value 
was experienced as the effects of the economic crisis began to be felt in October 
2008.  These sudden decreases contributed to an overall mean of 81 index points per 
day with 47% volatility. 
As stated above, Torm A/S is involved in the ownership and operation of vessels that 
carry both wet and dry commodities.  The company operates all its vessels 
worldwide but have different asset portfolio strategies for the tanker and dry bulk 
sector.  The dry bulk department is much specialised, with seventeen Panamaxes, 
ranging between 69,000-84,0000dwt, on their books (Torm A/S, 2009).  A different 
strategy to that utilised by Norden A/S.  The tanker portfolio strategy on the other 
hand is based on diversification.  Torm operates 57 Handymaxes, 28 Panamaxes, and 
43 Aframaxes which are mainly employed for the transportation of refined products 
(Torm A/S, 2009).  This fleet comprises vessels that are fully owned and chartered-in 
on short and long-term time charters.  It also includes vessels that are commercially 
managed by Torm as the manager of a pool or through contracts with third-party 
owners.  Up till the end of 2008, the company owned just over 50% of the fleet and 
chartered in about 20% of the vessels.  The rest of the fleet was commercially 
managed for third-party owners and charterers (Thomson Reuters, 2009). 
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The company has been constantly developing a strategy to become a more globalised 
company in order to gain access to more markets, with an increased focus on time 
charters and paper trading (Torm A/S, 2009).  By forming part of pools the company 
can achieve its desire to expand as pools offer flexibility and ensures that there is 
ample tonnage in the major regions.  It is no coincidence that Torm operates the 
largest product tanker pool in the world (Torm A/S, 2009).   
Finally, DFDS A/S is worthy of a mention for three reasons.  To begin with it was 
the only company whose share value showed the prosperity of the market from 2006 
to mid-2008, albeit with substantial volatility.  Secondly, the impact of the financial 
crisis seemed to have had an effect on DFDS share prices a few weeks prior to the 
other listed companies.  DFDS share value began to decrease in the first week of 
August 2009 while the other companies and the S&P500 index continued to rise for 
the next three weeks.  Lastly, following this initial decline, DFDS share value 
recovered slightly hovering around the hundred mark base rate before dipping once 
again in February 2009.  DFDS shares seemed to have shown more resilience to 
market conditions than other companies. 
DFDS A/S is engaged within five business areas, which extend beyond sea 
transportation.  The Ro-Ro shipping, the container shipping and the passenger 
shipping are responsible for activities in the route network, while the terminal 
services and the trailer services support the network by port terminal operations and 
trailer activities (Thomson Reuters, 2009).  The entire fleet therefore consists of a 
wide array of vessels, namely 23 freight vessels, five passenger ships, eight side-
port/container ships, seven container ships, ten tramp vessels and 16 tourist boats 
(DFDS A/S, 2009).  It is also worth mentioning, that unlike almost all the other 
companies, DFDS’s operations are very region specific, concentrating on routes 
between Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom.  The average share value 
was 148 for the entire period, with a 32% volatility – which is at the lower end of the 
scale when compared to the 20 other companies being analysed. 
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Figure 4.6 EURONEXT Share Listed Companies, 2005-2009 
Source: Author and Google Finance 
Table 4.5 Summary Statistics of  EURONEXT share listed companies. 
Class of Vessel Mean 
points/day 
Standard Deviation 
        points/day     % mean 
CMB SA 124 51 41% 
EURONAV NV 86 23 27% 
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
EURONAV NV owns and operates a fleet of modern large tankers.   The 
management of the fleet is carried out through various fully owned subsidiaries, and 
these services are also extended to third parties.  Therefore, the fully owned fleet is 
augmented by vessels that are chartered-in.  EURONAV’s core fleet has an average 
age of just over five years (Thomson Reuters, 2009).  The total fleet as at August 
2009 comprised of 17 VLCCs, 24 Suezmaxes and two FSO units employed on a mix 
of spot market fixtures and time charters (EURONAV NV, 2009).  EURONAV 
shares proved to be the least volatile over the three and a half year period under 
scrutiny, with a standard deviation of 27% of the 86 point mean.  This compares to 
Compagnie Maritime Belge SA, which had a standard deviation of 41% of the 124 
point mean.   
Compagnie Maritime Belge SA, also known as CMB, is engaged in the sea 
transportation of dry bulk goods through its wholly owned subsidiary, Bocimar.  As 
of 29th July 2009, its fleet consisted of 16 wholly or partially owned vessels, 14 of 
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which are Capesizes, one Handymax and one Handysize.  Through another 
subsidiary they also own 50% of a Panamax tanker (Compagnie Maritime Belge SA, 
2009).  However, CMB, through other subsidiaries is also involved in aviation 
operations, services and leasing activities, real estate and logistics services (Thomson 
Reuters, 2009).  While EURONAV shares traded within a much narrower range, at 
no time did they reach the share value highs of Compagnie Maritime Belge, which 
rose to almost twice those of EURONAV.  
4.3 Estimation of Beta Value of Dry Bulk and Tanker Companies 
As stated in section 4.1, the entire market has an underlying Beta () value of 1.0 
while the existence of systematic risk for a company might explain why its beta 
value might be more or less than 1.  This last section estimates the beta value of the 
21 shipping companies as described in the previous section (4.2) using the S&P 500 
Index as representative of the overall market performance. The estimation of the beta 
value was derived (section 4.1 equation Y) using statistics on the total risk for a 
specific company measured by the standard deviation (j), the risk on the market 
(M) and on the correlation coefficient between the asset j and the market M (pjM) 
from December 2005 to June 2009 so that: 
M
jMj
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The results (Table 4.6) using S&P 500 as index for the market for the 21 companies 
listed on various stock market from December 2005 to June 2009 are presented in 
Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Summary Statistics of Listed Companies. 
Company Index Correl-
Coef 
Systematic Risk Beta Value Stock 
market 
Golden Ocean S&P500 55% 171 9.72 OSL 
DryShips Inc. S&P500 54% 136 7.74 NASDAQ 
Excel Maritime S&P500 61% 77 4.90 NYSE 
EURONAV S&P500 86% 74 4.19 Euronext 
CMB S&P500 82% 41 2.35 Euronext 
DFDS A/S S&P500 81% 38 2.18 CSE 
FreeSeas Inc. S&P500 84% 38 2.14 NASDAQ 
Teekay S&P500 96% 31 1.98 NYSE 
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Golar LNG Ltd. S&P500 86% 34 1.91 NASDAQ 
Bonheur ASA S&P500 70% 32 1.80 OSL 
Overseas S&P500 87% 26 1.69 NYSE 
Torm A/S S&P500 77% 29 1.66 CSE 
Tsakos Energy S&P500 62% 23 1.45 NYSE 
Wilh Wilhelmsen S&P500 91% 23 1.33 OSL 
D/S Norden S&P500 35% 21 1.20 CSE 
Kirby Corp. S&P500 58% 19 1.19 NYSE 
A.P. Moller  S&P500 91% 19 1.06 CSE 
Frontline Ltd. S&P500 60% 16 1.03 NYSE 
Stolt Nielsen SA S&P500 77% 17 0.99 OSL 
TopShips Inc. S&P500 49% 13 0.77 NASDAQ 
Nordic American S&P500 58% 7 0.46 NYSE 
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
Concentrating on the top of the table, it appears that the OSL listed company Golden 
Ocean Group Limited was the one performing the best on all markets (see previous 
section), and is also found to have the highest beta value (9.72). It was not, however, 
the company with the highest standard deviation (standard deviation of 79% to the 
mean share value against 89% for Dryship.inc). This result is in-line with theory 
suggesting that companies with higher standard deviation are not automatically the 
one with the highest return, as a part of this risk could be diversified away. The two 
following companies found with high systematic risks are DryShip.Inc (beta value of 
7.74) and Excel Maritime Ltd. (beta value of 4.90).  
It is interesting to notice that the first three companies do share one common element 
as shown in the previous section.  They have all employed similar strategies, that is, 
they are all specialised in the dry bulk market with the majority of vessels all above 
70,000dwt.  All three companies fixed their vessels on a combination of long-term 
time charters and on the spot market. This result appears to confirm conclusions from 
the former chapters on the behaviour of earnings of the dry bulk market. It was stated 
that due to the characteristics of these markets, they move in a similar way (between 
spot and time charter as well as between different vessel size), making differentiation 
difficult to achieve whilst retaining high  returns.   
Interestingly EURONAV NV, is the only company specialised in the tanker sector 
that has a strong correlation with the overall market and still has a beta value of more 



than four.  This is in stark contrast to the three specialised dry bulker companies.  
However, it must be remembered that EURONAV share values were nowhere close 
to those of Golden Ocean, DryShips or Excel Maritime. 
CMB, DFDS and FreeSeas all have a beta value above two and shared a strong 
correlation with the S&P500.  CMB and DFDS are both highly diversified 
companies and the lower risk and close correlation with the market is a reasonable 
outcome.  The results of FreeSeas Inc. are more surprising as the company is highly 
specialised in the Handymax and Handysize sectors. 
Many companies which have a beta value between 1.0 and 1.99, all shunned 
specialisation to a certain degree.  Kirby, A.P. Moller, Wilh. Wilhelmsen and 
Bonheur are all highly diversified in many sectors which include both seaborne 
transportation and non-related industries.  The fleets owned and operated by Torm 
A/S and Norden are made up of various dry bulk carriers and various tankers, which 
indicates a high degree of diversification within the seaborne transportation industry.  
Teekay, Overseas and Frontline adopted a strategy of diversification, operating 
vessels within tanker sectors, supplemented by OBOs, FSOs, LNG and LPG carriers.   
Tsakos Energy and Golar LNG were the only companies which specialised though 
the explanation for the low beta value is the very long term charters under which 
both companies operate their vessels are operated. 
A similar picture emerges for two of the companies that underperformed when 
compared to the entire market.  Stolt Nielsen SA and TopShips Inc., as is seen 
earlier, both adopted diversified shipping portfolios. 
Nordic American Tanker Shipping Limited returned the most surprising results. with 
a beta value of 0.46.  As was discussed above the company is highly specialised in 
the tanker sector, owning and operating 13 double-hull Suezmax tankers averaging 
approximately 155,000 dwt each.  The chartering policy was to operate certain ships 
on the spot market while fixing other vessels for long term charters, usually to oil 
majors.  Nordic American was the company that experienced the least volatility 
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throughout the three and a half year period, with only 12% standard deviation, which 
is considerably lower than the volatility experienced by any other company that was 
analysed.  The company’s share value also fluctuated within the narrowest range of 
all the listed companies, with only 67 index points between either ends of the share 
value. Once more, this result seems to be consistent with former findings from 
Chapter 3, stressing that due to tanker market characteristics, risk reduction through 
specialisation could be achieved, which could explain low beta values (and low 
earnings) for companies operating and specialising their activities within this sector.  
4.4 Application of Capital Asset Pricing Model  
Having analysed the systematic risk associated with each company, by determining 
the correlation between each company and the overall market, the next step is to 
establish the most appropriate portfolio for a certain type of investor.  This will be 
determined on the basis of a two asset portfolio, that is, to split portfolio in x=50% in 
A and (1-x)=50% in B.  From the 21 companies that have been analysed, 210 
possible portfolios (Annex B) are available to an investor.  The most worthwhile 
investments would differ according to the type of investor.  A risk averse investor 
would look at very different aspects of a particular portfolio than say an investor who 
is more inclined to taking risks. 
If an investor is risk averse, than the parameters to determine the most appropriate 
portfolio would be based on the lowest standard deviation, that is, the risk involved.  
In order to compare risk of the various portfolios the standard deviation was taken as 
a percentage of the expected returns.  The results of the five portfolios with the 
lowest percentage were selected and presented in the Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Portfolios with the Lowest Standard Deviation. 
Companies % Invest. E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Nordic American 50% 94.57 213.64 14.62 15% 
A.P. Moller 50%     
Nordic American 50% 123.78 370.02 19.24 16% 
Kirby Corp. 50%     
Nordic American 50% 96.72 239.77 15.48 16% 
EURONAV 50%     
Nordic American 50% 101.74 309.73 17.6 17% 
Frontline 50%     
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Nordic American 50% 83.82 211.75 14.55 17% 
Stolt Nielsen 50%     
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
Immediately, it is discernible that each of the portfolios includes Nordic American, 
the company which underperformed compared to the overall market and with the 
lowest beta value of all the companies at 0.46.  Furthermore, apart from the portfolio 
that includes EURONAV N/V, all portfolios combine companies with some of the 
lowest beta values.  
It also, transpires that the expected returns do not necessarily increase as the risk 
increases.  Therefore, the first two portfolios would be most likely considered by a 
risk averse investor.  The third, fourth and fifth portfolios would not be worthwhile, 
as the other two portfolios could ensure more earnings with less risk. 
To begin with, the portfolio that includes investments in Nordic American Tanker 
Shipping Limited and A.P. Moller Maersk has the lowest standard deviation as a 
percentage of expected returns.  As was outlined above, A.P. Moller Maersk is a 
highly diversified company, while Nordic American has adopted the complete 
opposite strategy, specialising in the Suezmax tanker sector.  Looking at the 
individual companies in detail, the low beta values for both companies is a 
justification for the low risk factor of the portfolio.  While A.P. Moller Maersk had a 
beta value of 1.06, which is practically equivalent to that of the entire market, the 
Nordic American beta value was below that of the market.   Furthermore, share 
prices for both companies had the lowest share volatility as a percentage of all the 
companies (Nordic American 12%; A.P. Moller Maersk 24%). 
Further, A.P. Moller Maersk has one of the highest correlations with the S&P 500, 
that is, the entire market.  So, investing in the entire market or A.P. Moller Maersk 
will produce very similar results.  On the other hand, Nordic American’s correlation 
with the overall market was much less at 58%, which indicates that its share prices 
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follow a different pattern to that of A.P. Moller Maersk and results in a substantial 
diversification within the portfolio. 
What is interesting is that despite having the lowest standard deviation as a 
percentage of earnings, this portfolio is by no means the portfolio with the lowest 
expected returns, making it even more appealing to a risk averse investor.   
Nordic American combined with Kirby Corp. proved to be the only other worthwhile 
investment for a risk averse investor.  The mean value of Kirby Corp.’s shares was 
by far the highest of all the companies included in these five low risk portfolios and 
with a relatively low volatility.  Kirby Corp. did have a slightly higher beta value 
than that of A.P. Moller Maersk but an interesting aspect emerges when the 
correlation to the overall market is factored in. 
A.P. Moller Maersk had a strong correlation with the S&P 500 which indicated that 
diversification of A.P. Moller’s shares and those of Nordic American reduced the 
portfolio risk.  However, Kirby Corp.’s correlation with the S&P 500 is exactly the 
same as that between Nordic American and the overall market.  This would seem to 
debunk the strong effect the correlation of A.P. Moller Maersk with the S&P 500 had 
on the portfolio risk. 
The second and third portfolios contain the same amount of risk, although the 
portfolio of Nordic American and EURONAV has lower returns.  What stands out 
about this portfolio is that EURONAV is the only company within the five lowest 
risk portfolios that has such a high beta value.  Other company statistics show that 
the EURONAV is very similar with regard to the mean share value and standard 
deviation to other companies. 
From a different perspective, the most suitable portfolios for a risk neutral investor 
would be extremely different.  Such an investor is indifferent to risk and only seeks 
to maximise his returns when selecting an investment (Investopedia, 2009). 
However, as was discussed earlier on in the chapter, an investor would generally 
seek to be rewarded for taking on additional risk. 
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Assuming an investor is risk neutral, the top five portfolios from the possible 210, 
would be very different from those selected by the risk averse investor assumed 
under the CAPM.  The Table 4.8 outlines the five portfolios with the highest 
expected earnings. 
Table 4.8 Portfolios with the Highest Expected Earnings. 
Companies % Invest. E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Golden Ocean 50% 341.67 79466.04 281.9 83% 
DryShips 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 285.81 47307.01 217.5 76% 
Excel 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 272.57 30578.53 174.87 64% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 270.67 27974.49 167.26 62% 
Bonheur ASA 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 268.38 28880.73 169.94 63% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
From the outset, it is apparent that for the top five highest earning portfolios, the 
standard deviation does not decrease as the expected returns decrease.  However, 
since a risk neutral investor only seeks to maximise returns, all five portfolios would 
be considered, but the first four would be most worthwhile. 
The two highest earning portfolios consist of companies with very similar shipping 
strategies, specialising in the larger dry bulk sectors with a mix of long-term and spot 
market charters.  These companies had the highest peak earnings and beta values of 
all the companies assessed and as was discussed in the previous sections, these 
elements are conducive with markets in which the three companies trade and comes 
as no surprise.  The companies also have a correlation with the overall market of 
54%-61%, which indicates that they do not have the strongest of correlations with 
the market, and would react slightly differently to the overall market. 
Another aspect that was discussed in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter is that 
despite the possibility of astronomical earnings, the dry bulk sector also brings with 
it the highest risk of all.  Such is the case with the leading portfolio as the standard 
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deviation is 281.9, an incredible 83% of the expected returns.  It is worth mentioning 
that despite these high returns, this portfolio is not the riskiest of the possible 210. 
The other three portfolios that conclude the top five highest earners add another 
dimension to these types of portfolios.  Golden Ocean, the high risk – high earning, 
specialised company, remains the common company in all three portfolios.  The 
other three companies, DFDS A/S, Bonheur ASA and Kirby Corp. unlike DryShips 
Inc. and Excel Maritime, all utilise a strategy of diversification, albeit to varying 
degrees.  As seen in the various company analyses in Table 4.8, these three 
companies have produced the same returns over the last three and a half years, with 
similar means and standard deviations. 
A thought provoking issue, is the rise in standard deviation in the portfolio 
containing Golden Ocean and Kirby Corp.  Kirby Corp. has the lowest beta value of 
all the three diversified companies.  Furthermore, the share value volatility was 10% 
less than that of DFDS and Bonheur, which both stood at 32%.  The only logical 
explanation for this rise in portfolio risk seems to result from the lower correlation 
between Kirby Corp. and the S&P 500. 
Table 4.9 Summary Statistics of Listed Companies. 
Company Index Corel-
Coef 
Systematic 
Risk 
Beta Value Stock 
Market 
DFDS A/S S&P500 81% 38 2.18 CSE 
Bonheur ASA S&P500 70% 32 1.80 OSL 
Kirby Corp. S&P500 58% 19 1.19 NYSE 
Notes: Sample covers December 2005 to June 2009 (Weekly Data) 
Source: Data from Google Finance 
Calculations: Author 
With a correlation with the overall market of 58%, Kirby Corp. is more similar in 
this respect to DryShips and Excel Maritime than it is to the two diversified 
companies.  DFDS and Bonheur have stronger correlations with the S&P500 than 
any other companies within these five higher earnings portfolios.  One can deduce 
from this that by having two companies with weaker correlations to the market is 
likely to increase the volatility of a portfolio’s earnings. 
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4.5 Results  
To conclude, the results of the analysis infer that the companies that specialised in 
the dry bulk sector were the most volatile.  However, the results of the beta values 
indicate that when there is a market upturn, these specialised companies are at the 
forefront to reap incredible returns.  Such was the case during 2007-2008, with the 
world economy booming, when the dry bulk shipping companies outperformed all 
other companies and the market as a whole.  However, the old adage seemed to ring 
true for these companies: ‘the higher you climb the harder you fall’.  The onset of the 
economic crisis brought the share value of the three most specialised companies in 
the dry bulk sector into a free fall.  Golden Ocean Group Limited saw 90% of its 
share value disappear within the last quarter of 2008. 
On the other hand, companies that have chosen to diversify, and companies that have 
focused on the tanker markets showed less volatility.  The large majority of these 
companies all grew in share value during the market upturn, but nowhere close to the 
growth experienced by the dry bulk-specialised companies.  These companies too 
were not able to avoid the dire effects brought on by the financial crisis; however, the 
decrease in value was not as drastic as that experienced by companies such as 
Golden Ocean, Excel Maritime and DryShips.

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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
The study of the freight rates of the various markets (Chapters 2 and 3) coupled with 
the analysis of the listed companies (Chapter 4) was imperative in order to establish 
the effectiveness of a specialised strategy when compared to a diversified strategy.  
By establishing a relationship between the freight rates, the correlation of dry bulk 
and tanker sectors and the share value of the listed companies, the most appropriate 
strategy can be deduced for both risk averse and risk neutral investors. 
However, before drawing any conclusions from the results in the previous chapters, 
it must be borne in mind that other factors are likely to come into play.  The 21 
companies that have been analysed are from five different stock exchanges, each 
with its own parameters for listing companies, operating in different countries and 
with different currencies.  Furthermore, each company has different management 
styles and is exposed to a wide array of risks.  Finally, shipping strategies are 
constantly evolving, which makes it impossible to group companies too rigidly for 
the 20 year period under scrutiny.  For example, a company may be classified as one 
that has adopted a strategy of specialisation within the dry bulk sector but the ratio of 
ships owned and chartered-in and the importance given to a particular class of 
vessels over another varies greatly.  To further compound the situation, vessels may 
be chartered for as little as a few weeks to as much as the lifespan of the vessel.  
Once these elements are all factored in, over the two decades being studied, each 
company’s strategy may have morphed countless times. 
Ultimately, investors often act irrationally, either in an attempt to beat the market or 
as a knee-jerk reaction to unfavourable news.  Technology has made information free 
and quickly accessible making the share value of a company rather volatile. 
From the results in Chapters 3 and 4, it transpires that there is a close relation 
between a company’s performance and its shipping strategy.  Companies like Golden 
Ocean Group Ltd., DryShips Inc. and Excel Maritime all developed a specialised 
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strategy, focusing on owning and operating large vessels in the dry bulk market.  The 
share value of these companies increased and decreased as dry bulk freight rates 
peaked and collapsed.  Furthermore, the share value of these companies increased 
much more than any of the other companies over the last five years, which is 
representative of the astronomical freight rates experienced in the dry bulk market. 
Another characteristic which is unique to the dry bulk sector is the extremely strong 
correlation between the markets.  This coupled with the high standard deviation of 
earnings, makes specialisation with the dry bulk sector a very risky investment.  This 
was confirmed in the data analysis of the listed companies as the three companies 
with the highest beta values are the companies specialising in the dry bulk sector. 
Conversely, companies that developed a diversified strategy, generally recorded low 
beta values. Companies such as A.P. Moller-Maersk, Kirby Corp., Wilh Wilhelmsen, 
Stolt Nielsen SA and Bonheur ASA have business interests beyond the maritime 
transportation industry.  These companies all recorded a beta value below 2, 
therefore performing very similar to the overall market.  The results indicate that 
such a diversified strategy will substantially reduce risk but this comes at the cost of 
a considerably lower mean share value.  Apart from a spike in Bonheur’s share value 
prior to a substantial share split, these companies all recorded relatively low mean 
share values.  Due to the highly diversified strategy of these companies, it is hard to 
gauge the contribution of the shipping interests towards each company’s risk and 
return; however, they provide a relevant comparison. 
Other companies chose a diversified strategy within the maritime transportation 
industry and as was expected managed to reduce their risk.  Companies such as D/S 
Norden, TopShips Inc. and Torm A/S own and operate fleets which consist of vessels 
from both the dry bulk and the tanker sectors.  A combination of voyage charters and 
time charters are then utilised in order to strike a balance between income stability 
and maximising profits during market peaks.  From the summary statistics of the 
time charter earnings for all the bulk carrier vessels, it emerged that as the duration 
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of the time charter period increases, the freight rate volatility decreases.  Also, the 
results of the Portfolio Theory indicate that when fixing vessels on the spot market 
the ideal way to reduce risk is through diversification. 
Finally, the summary statistics of Nordic American, Frontline Ltd. and Teekay prove 
how through specialisation risk does not necessarily increase.  Not only did these 
companies all record low beta values, Nordic American’s beta value was below 1.  
As was explained in Chapter 3, the relatively weak correlation between the tanker 
sectors made specialisation a sensible shipping strategy. Further, these three 
companies all have a considerable part of their respective fleets on long term charters 
in order to further reduce risk.  This confirms the results of the Portfolio Theory, as 
the asset portfolio with the lowest risk included two tankers.  
From these results it can be concluded that despite the countless elements that can be 
factored in when determining the correct strategy for a shipping company, the 
summary statistics remain a very valid indicator.  By and large, the pattern of the 
share value of the companies analysed mirrored the pattern of the freight rates of the 
ships that the company owned and/or operated. 
The results of the Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model made it 
abundantly clear that a specialised portfolio can be more worthwhile than a 
diversified portfolio, depending on the investor’s risk strategy.  What the results of 
the Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model do not reveal is that, a 
diversified strategy may have very different implications for onshore personnel than 
a specialised strategy may have. 
In order to establish the effects that either strategy may have on a company’s onshore 
personnel, an online questionnaire (Annex 3) was drawn up and submitted to ship-
owning/-managing companies worldwide.  The questionnaire consisted of 12 
multiple choice questions and was submitted in five different languages, including 
four of the official and working languages of the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO). 
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The purpose of the questionnaire was to unearth whether companies that owned 
and/or managed ships chose to have in-house departments to operate the vessels.  
Therefore a question was set in order to determine whether companies had any or all 
of the following departments: an Operations Department, a Technical Department 
and a Chartering Department.  From the 84 responses that were submitted only 1% of 
the companies had none of these departments. 
The questionnaire was then set out in order to discover how companies managed 
these departments.  For example, whether the superintendents within the operations 
department are assigned to particular types of vessels or whether they were assigned 
vessels randomly.  The results of the questionnaire reveal that a large majority of 
companies tend to assign jobs to personnel within these departments according to the 
type of vessel.  75% of respondents stated that operations superintendents are 
assigned to particular types of vessels, for example, either to dry bulk vessels or to 
tankers.  Furthermore, 62% declared that if superintendents were to be assigned to a 
different type of vessel, than additional training is a company requirement.  Very 
similar results were also produced for technical superintendents.  Within the 
chartering department, this strategy is not as clear cut.  54% of respondents do assign 
charterers to fix specific types of vessels and 48% have a policy of training personnel 
should they be assigned to a different class of vessels. 
More than two-thirds of the companies that submitted a response share the same 
strategy when it comes to crewing.  83% of the companies assign crew to specific 
types of vessels and should crew be employed on a different type of vessel it is 
company policy to have crew undergo some sort of training. 
Apart from the results of the chartering department, it is clear that companies tend to 
lean towards a specialised regime within the operations and technical departments 
and in the manner in which they man the vessels.  By applying this strategy to the 
results of the correlation between the various bulk sectors it can be deduced that 
there are advantages to be gained from specialisation in certain sectors.  While a 
specialised dry bulk strategy is only recommended for risk neutral investors, the 
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same is not true for a specialised tanker strategy.  The correlation between the tanker 
sectors was not so strong and in Chapter 2 it emerged that in the one-year and three-
year time charters, Aframax freight rates were the least volatile but not with the 
lowest earnings. 
Specialisation could actually lead to a situation whereby a company is more flexible 
to change its shipping strategy and more responsive to changes in market conditions.  
If a company chose to change its shipping strategy from one of diversification to one 
of specialisation or vice versa, the results of the questionnaire reveal that a 
substantial part of on-shore personnel and crew would have to undergo training.  
However, a company that chooses to specialise within one sector could shift 
personnel between different types of vessels more easily.  For example, should a 
company that owns a fleet of tankers choose to adopt a less risky strategy, the 
Aframax tankers on time charters of over one year would be the best option.  
Therefore, as the company shifts towards increasing its Aframax fleet, on shore 
personnel could easily be assigned the new vessels and crew retention could be 
maintained.  This would be done without the additional time and money needed to 
train personnel and offers further job security.  It could also be argued that a 
specialised company would benefit from less overheard costs through downsizing of 
onshore personnel. 
By understanding the freight rates and the respective volatility, an investor can 
quantify and control risk, thereby managing to alter the risk profile according to the 
prevailing market conditions and risk preference.  Ultimately, there is no one ideal 
shipping strategy.  A risk averse investor may prefer a strategy which involves 
vessels chartered on a long term basis while a risk neutral investor would be more 
inclined to invest in the dry bulk market, as to reduce risk often means to lock in a 
low return.  What is interesting is that a specialised tanker strategy may now offer a 
relatively low risk investment with additional on-shore gains; a strategy that has 
never really been viewed as synonymous with risk reduction but could in fact offer 
stability to an otherwise volatile industry. 
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Annex A: Portfolio Theory Results in Order of % StD 
Three Year Time Charter 
Portfolio Theory-Dry Bulk/Tanker 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Capesize 50% 19,519 115,159,752 10,731 55% 
Products 50%         
Capesize 50% 21,132 94,119,872 9,702 46% 
Aframax 50%         
Capesize 50% 23,275 100,195,282 10,010 43% 
Suezmax 50%         
Capesize 50% 28,525 116,119,446 10,776 38% 
VLCC 50%         
Panamax 50% 13,396 24,754,385 4,975 37% 
Products 50%         
Handymax 50% 13,572 23,584,380 4,856 36% 
Products 50%         
Handysize 50% 12,486 15,714,754 3,964 32% 
Products 50%         
Panamax 50% 15,009 16,665,017 4,082 27% 
Aframax 50%         
Panamax 50% 17,152 20,169,255 4,491 26% 
Suezmax 50%         
Handymax 50% 17,328 19,184,879 4,380 25% 
Suezmax 50%         
Handymax 50% 15,186 14,520,472 3,811 25% 
Aframax 50%         
Panamax 50% 22,402 27,188,238 5,214 23% 
VLCC 50%         
Handymax 50% 22,579 26,064,856 5,105 23% 
VLCC 50%         
Handysize 50% 16,242 13,285,129 3,645 22% 
Suezmax 50%         
Handysize 50% 14,100 8,622,475 2,936 21% 
Aframax 50%         
Handysize 50% 21,493 18,963,951 4,355 20% 
VLCC 50%         
 
     
Portfolio Theory - Tanker Sector 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Suezmax 50% 18,547 11,508,685 3,392 18% 
Products 50%         


VLCC 50% 27,554 22,573,487 4,751 17% 
Suezmax 50%         
VLCC 50% 23,798 15,716,235 3,964 17% 
Products 50%         
Suezmax 50% 20,161 11,448,712 3,384 17% 
Aframax 50%         
Aframax 50% 16,405 5,941,950 2,438 15% 
Products 50%         
VLCC 50% 25,411 13,440,506 3,666 14% 
Aframax 50%         
 
     
Portfolio Theory - Dry Bulk Sector 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Capesize 50% 18,123 171,376,833 13,091 72% 
Panamax 50%         
Capesize 50% 17,214 143,508,312 11,979 70% 
Handysize 50%         
Capesize 50% 18,300 161,388,549 12,704 69% 
Handymax 50%         
Panamax 50% 12,177 52,314,342 7,233 59% 
Handymax 50%         
Panamax 50% 11,091 38,967,661 6,242 56% 
Handysize 50%         
Handymax 50% 11,267 35,091,693 5,924 53% 
Handysize 50%         
 
One Year Time Charter 
Portfolio Theory-Dry Bulk/Tanker 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Capesize 50% 21,820 255,059,048 15,971 73% 
Products 50%     
Capesize 50% 23,767 236,591,889 15,382 65% 
Aframax 50%     
Capesize 50% 26,359 268,112,290 16,374 62% 
Suezmax 50%     
Capesize 50% 31,627 330,939,396 18,192 58% 
VLCC 50%     
Panamax 50% 14,888 68,899,019 8,301 56% 
Products 50%     
Handymax 50% 14,732 57,438,597 7,579 51% 
Products 50%     
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Panamax 50% 19,426 78,534,498 8,862 46% 
Suezmax 50%     
Panamax 50% 16,834 60,739,061 7,794 46% 
Aframax 50%     
Handysize 50% 13,084 36,739,273 6,061 46% 
Products 50%     
Panamax 50% 24,695 114,233,637 10,688 43% 
VLCC 50%     
Handymax 50% 19,271 69,285,974 8,324 43% 
Suezmax 50%     
Handymax 50% 16,679 50,659,091 7,118 43% 
Aframax 50%     
Handymax 50% 24,539 103,914,912 10,194 42% 
VLCC 50%     
Handysize 50% 17,623 46,755,345 6,838 39% 
Suezmax 50%     
Handysize 50% 22,891 76,638,606 8,754 38% 
VLCC 50%     
Handysize 50% 15,031 30,615,989 5,533 37% 
Aframax 50%     
 
     
Portfolio Theory - Tanker Sector 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
VLCC 50% 29,227 89,437,520 9,457 32% 
Suezmax 50%         
VLCC 50% 24,688 61,765,529 7,859 32% 
Products 50%         
Suezmax 50% 19,420 37,860,968 6,153 32% 
Products 50%         
VLCC 50% 26,635 60,965,728 7,808 29% 
Aframax 50%         
Suezmax 50% 21,366 38,865,251 6,234 29% 
Aframax 50%         
Aframax 50% 16,828 21,497,858 4,637 28% 
Products 50%         
 
     
Portfolio Theory - Dry Bulk Sector 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Capesize 50% 21,827 410,236,461 20,254 93% 
Panamax 50%         
Capesize 50% 20,024 328,918,729 18,136 91% 


Handysize 50%         
Capesize 50% 21,672 370,224,355 19,241 89% 
Handymax 50%         
Panamax 50% 14,739 150,037,270 12,249 83% 
Handymax 50%         
Panamax 50% 13,091 111,131,867 10,542 81% 
Handysize 50%         
Handymax 50% 12,936 92,991,360 9,643 75% 
Handysize 50%         
 
Spot Market 
Portfolio Theory – Dry Bulk/Tanker 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Capesize 50% 31,056 583,696,486 24,160 78% 
Suezmax 50%         
Capesize 50% 23,998 341,839,494 18,489 77% 
Products 50%         
Capesize 50% 28,006 447,057,393 21,144 75% 
Aframax 50%         
Panamax 50% 28,086 435,037,975 20,858 74% 
VLCC 50%         
Handysize 50% 25,117 318,523,782 17,847 71% 
VLCC 50%         
Panamax 50% 24,401 298,597,200 17,280 71% 
Suezmax 50%         
Handymax 50% 26,793 355,588,875 18,857 70% 
VLCC 50%         
Capesize 50% 34,741 520,394,106 22,812 66% 
VLCC 50%         
Handymax 50% 23,107 230,526,073 15,183 66% 
Suezmax 50%         
Handysize 50% 21,432 199,395,682 14,121 66% 
Suezmax 50%         
Panamax 50% 21,351 192,092,293 13,860 65% 
Aframax 50%         
Panamax 50% 17,343 128,554,398 11,338 65% 
Products 50%         
Handymax 50% 20,057 136,300,198 11,675 58% 
Aframax 50%         
Handysize 50% 18,382 111,359,529 10,553 57% 
Aframax 50%         
Handymax 50% 16,049 82,393,085 9,077 57% 

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Products 50%         
Handysize 50% 14,374 61,512,728 7,843 55% 
Products 50%         
 
     
Portfolio Theory – Tanker Sector 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Suezmax 50% 18,512 335,690,120 18,322 99% 
Aframax 50%         
VLCC 50% 25,834 646,630,708 25,429 98% 
Suezmax 50%         
Aframax 50% 12,123 137,690,639 11,734 97% 
Products 50%         
Suezmax 50% 15,668 226,395,580 15,046 96% 
Products 50%         
VLCC 50% 32,259 469,317,136 21,664 67% 
Aframax 50%         
VLCC 50% 28,251 341,948,776 18,492 65% 
Products 50%         
 
50%     
Portfolio Theory – Dry Bulk Sector 
Vessel % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Capesize 50% 23,833 559,721,457 23,658 99% 
Panamax 50%         
Panamax 50% 14,209 155,262,951 12,460 88% 
Handysize 50%         
Capesize 50% 20,864 389,828,862 19,744 95% 
Handysize 50%         
Capesize 50% 22,539 447,750,557 21,160 94% 
Handymax 50%         
Panamax 50% 15,884 192,819,440 13,886 87% 
Handymax 50%         
Handymax 50% 12,915 99,908,367 9,995 77% 
Handysize 50%         
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Annex B: CAPM Results In Order of Expected Earnings 
Companies % Invest. E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Golden Ocean 50% 341.67 79466.04 281.9 83% 
DryShips 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 285.81 47307.01 217.5 76% 
Excel 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 272.57 30578.53 174.87 64% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 270.67 27974.49 167.26 62% 
Golden Ocean 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 268.38 28880.73 169.94 63% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 264.71 30047.86 173.34 65% 
Tsakos 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 260.38 31525.36 177.55 68% 
CMB 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 255.12 28104.24 167.64 66% 
Overseas 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 252.19 25272.38 158.97 63% 
Nordic American 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 251.83 29759.08 172.51 69% 
Golar LNG 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 250.98 30251.04 173.93 69% 
FreeSeas 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 246.34 27727.45 166.52 68% 
Frontline 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 244.92 27597.73 166.13 68% 
Teekay 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 241.32 26046.05 161.39 67% 
EURONAV 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 240.38 25591.27 159.97 67% 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 239.18 26265.19 162.07 68% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 239.03 24809.08 157.51 66% 
Torm A/S 50%         
DryShips 50% 230.68 35869.25 189.39 82% 
Excel 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 228.42 24628.11 156.93 69% 
Stolt Nielsen 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 226.34 21672.09 147.21 65% 
D/S Norden 50%         

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Companies % Invest. E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
DryShips 50% 217.44 20985.12 144.86 67% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Golden Ocean 50% 216.29 23753.24 154.12 71% 
TopShips 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 215.54 18991.12 137.81 64% 
DryShips 50%         
DryShips 50% 213.25 19869.74 140.96 66% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
DryShips 50% 209.58 20766.89 144.11 69% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
DryShips 50% 205.25 21860.94 147.85 72% 
CMB 50%         
DryShips 50% 199.99 19197.42 138.55 69% 
Overseas 50%         
DryShips 50% 197.07 16859.95 129.85 66% 
Nordic American 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 196.7 20685.25 143.82 73% 
DryShips 50%         
DryShips 50% 195.85 21123 145.34 74% 
FreeSeas Inc. 50%         
DryShips 50% 191.21 19022.06 137.92 72% 
Frontline 50%         
DryShips 50% 189.79 18745.07 136.91 72% 
Teekay 50%         
DryShips 50% 186.2 17536.29 132.42 71% 
EURONAV 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 185.25 17130.4 130.88 71% 
DryShips 50%         
DryShips 50% 184.05 17677.54 132.96 72% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
DryShips 50% 183.9 16501.35 128.46 70% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 173.3 16364.45 127.92 74% 
DryShips 50%         
DryShips 50% 171.21 13995.18 118.3 69% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Excel 50% 161.58 6853.57 82.79 51% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
TopShips 50% 161.16 15852.47 125.91 78% 
DryShips 50%         
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Companies % Invest. E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Bonheur ASA 50% 159.68 5755.28 75.86 48% 
Excel Maritime 50%         
Excel Maritime 50% 157.39 5848.44 76.48 49% 
Kirby Corp 50%         
Excel Maritime 50% 153.72 6370.77 79.82 52% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
Excel 50% 149.39 7303.75 85.46 57% 
CMB 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 146.44 1766.16 42.03 29% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Kirby Corp. 50% 144.16 1311.88 36.22 25% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Excel Maritime 50% 144.13 5631.92 75.05 52% 
Overseas 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 142.25 1142.47 33.8 24% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Excel Maritime 50% 141.21 4415.55 66.45 47% 
Nordic American 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 140.84 6477.45 80.48 57% 
Excel 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 140.48 1539.74 39.24 28% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 139.99 6816.18 82.56 59% 
Excel 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 138.58 1244.71 35.28 25% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 136.3 906.67 30.11 22% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
EURONAV 50% 136.15 2290.72 47.86 35% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Excel Maritime 50% 135.35 5406.98 73.53 54% 
Frontline 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 134.25 1838.97 42.88 32% 
CMB 50%         
Excel Maritime 50% 133.93 5562.2 74.58 56% 
Teekay 50%         
Kirby Corp. 50% 131.96 1446.07 38.03 29% 
CMB 50%         
OverSeas 50% 130.89 1358.03 36.85 28% 
DFDS A/S 50%         


Companies % Invest. E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Excel 50% 130.34 4748.97 68.91 53% 
EURONAV NV 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 129.39 4722.89 68.72 53% 
Excel 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 128.98 1201.67 34.67 27% 
Overseas 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 128.29 1726.85 41.56 32% 
CMB 50%         
Excel 50% 128.19 4912.50 70.09 55% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Excel 50% 128.04 4585.40 67.72 53% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Nordic American 50% 127.97 757.72 27.53 22% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 127.6 1659.05 40.73 32% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 126.75 1827.29 42.75 34% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Overseas 50% 126.7 845.09 29.07 23% 
Kirby Corp 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 126.06 695.5 26.37 21% 
Nordic American 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 125.69 1414.13 37.6 30% 
Golar LNG 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 124.85 1621.05 40.26 32% 
FreeSeas Inc. 50%         
Nordic American 50% 123.78 370.02 19.24 16% 
Kirby Corp 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 123.41 1104.26 33.23 27% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 123.03 1028.34 32.07 26% 
Overseas 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 122.56 1262.19 35.53 29% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Frontline 50% 122.12 1086.87 32.97 27% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Teekay 50% 120.69 1462.13 38.24 32% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 120.21 972.75 31.19 26% 
Frontline Ltd. 50%         
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Companies % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Tsakos Energy 50% 120.11 494.69 22.24 19% 
Nordic American 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 119.74 1287.4 35.88 30% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 118.89 1484.76 38.53 32% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 118.79 1274.22 35.7 30% 
Teekay Corp. 50%         
OverSeas 50% 118.7 1490.77 38.61 33% 
CMB 50%         
Frontline Ltd. 50% 117.93 759.68 27.56 23% 
Kirby Corp 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 117.44 4318.64 65.72 56% 
Excel 50%         
CMB 50% 117.1 1172.39 34.24 29% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Teekay Corp 50% 116.5 796.17 28.22 24% 
Kirby Corp 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 116.16 1115.82 33.4 29% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Nordic American 50% 115.78 847.69 29.12 25% 
CMB 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 115.41 1877.87 43.33 38% 
CMB 50%         
Excel 50% 115.35 3693.28 60.77 53% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 115.19 964.13 31.05 27% 
EURONAV 50%         
A.P. Moller 50% 114.95 1023.78 32 28% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
DFDS A/S 50% 114.8 1408.24 37.53 33% 
Torm A/S 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 114.56 2074.04 45.54 40% 
CMB 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 114.26 913.19 30.22 26% 
Frontline 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 114.25 1041.3 32.27 28% 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 113.04 903.24 30.05 27% 
A.P. Moller  50%         

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Companies % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Bonheur ASA 50% 112.9 1346.45 36.69 33% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Kirby Corp. 50% 112.91 577.77 24.04 21% 
EURONAV 50%         
Teekay 50% 112.83 973.44 31.2 28% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 111.97 532.17 23.07 21% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Kirby Corp. 50% 110.76 509.44 22.57 20% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Kirby Corp. 50% 110.61 689.05 26.25 24% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Nordic American 50% 110.51 407.82 20.19 18% 
Overseas 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 110.15 1124.45 33.53 30% 
Overseas 50%         
Frontline 50% 109.92 1215.12 34.86 32% 
CMB 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 109.3 1339.8 36.6 33% 
Overseas 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 109.24 675.68 25.99 24% 
EURONAV 50%         
Teekay 50% 108.5 1605.16 40.06 37% 
CMB 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 108.3 645.36 25.4 23% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 107.22 539.56 23.23 22% 
Nordic American 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 107.09 652.55 25.54 24% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 106.94 749.65 27.38 26% 
Torm A/S 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 106.38 710.89 26.66 25% 
Nordic American 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 106.01 1690.57 41.12 39% 
FreeSeas Inc. 50%         
TopShips 50% 105.3 4099.69 64.03 61% 
Excel 50%         
CMB 50% 104.91 1117.96 33.44 32% 
EURONAV 50%         

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Companies % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Frontline 50% 104.66 763.05 27.62 26% 
Overseas 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 104.2 928.48 30.47 29% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 103.96 1216.75 34.88 34% 
CMB 50%         
Teekay 50% 103.24 920.88 30.35 29% 
Overseas 50%         
EURONAV 50% 102.76 1155.38 33.99 33% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
EURONAV 50% 102.61 1419.32 37.67 37% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 102.29 890.61 29.84 29% 
Stolt Nielsen 50%         
DFDS A/S 50% 102.12 1677.69 40.96 40% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Nordic American 50% 101.74 309.73 17.6 17% 
Frontline 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 101.37 950.2 30.83 30% 
Frontline Ltd. 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 100.52 1156.48 34.01 34% 
Frontline 50%         
Teekay 50% 100.31 424.26 20.6 21% 
Nordic American 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 100.21 1725.47 41.54 41% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 100.01 395.94 19.9 20% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 99.95 1173.5 34.26 34% 
Teekay Corp. 50%         
OverSeas 50% 99.64 648.32 25.46 26% 
EURONAV 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 99.1 1373.76 37.06 37% 
Teekay 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 98.7 661.86 25.73 26% 
Overseas 50%         
Kirby Corp. 50% 97.93 926.48 30.44 31% 
D/S Norden 50%         
OverSeas 50% 97.5 581.04 24.1 25% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
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Companies % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
OverSeas 50% 97.35 890.81 29.85 31% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Nordic American 50% 96.72 239.77 15.48 16% 
EURONAV 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 96.35 828.42 28.78 30% 
EURONAV 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 96.34 497.87 22.31 23% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 95.78 281.2 16.77 18% 
Nordic American 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 95.51 1015.62 31.87 33% 
EURONAV 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 95.41 882.95 29.71 31% 
Golar LNG 50%         
Nordic American 50% 94.57 213.64 14.62 15% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 94.56 1066.96 32.66 35% 
FreeSeas 50%         
Teekay 50% 94.46 697.24 26.41 28% 
Frontline 50%         
Nordic American 50% 94.43 498.88 22.34 24% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Tsakos Energy 50% 94.26 825.94 28.74 30% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 94.21 807.5 28.42 30% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 94.06 1058.26 32.53 35% 
Torm A/S 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 93.36 1012.13 31.81 34% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 93.21 1225.12 35 38% 
Torm A/S 50%         
TopShips 50% 92.06 778.56 27.9 30% 
DFDS A/S 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 92.01 1022.48 31.98 35% 
CMB 50%         
Frontline 50% 90.87 522.53 22.86 25% 
EURONAV 50%         
Bonheur ASA 50% 90.16 833.74 28.87 32% 
TopShips 50%         

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Companies % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 89.93 475.14 21.8 24% 
Frontline 50%         
EURONAV 50% 89.92 1472.91 38.38 43% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Teekay 50% 89.44 685.63 26.18 29% 
EURONAV 50%         
Frontline 50% 88.72 443.03 21.05 24% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Frontline 50% 88.57 646.94 25.44 29% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 88.5 791.25 28.13 32% 
Teekay 50%         
TopShips 50% 87.87 377.04 19.42 22% 
Kirby Corp. 50%         
Teekay 50% 87.3 659.86 25.69 29% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Teekay 50% 87.15 1074.32 32.78 38% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 86.74 524.21 22.9 26% 
Overseas 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 84.91 529.51 23.01 27% 
EURONAV 50%         
OverSeas 50% 84.66 1157.67 34.02 40% 
D/S Norden 50%         
TopShips 50% 84.2 444.69 21.09 25% 
Tsakos Energy 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 83.82 211.75 14.55 17% 
Nordic American 50%         
CMB 50% 83.7 411.05 20.27 24% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
CMB 50% 83.56 674.93 25.98 31% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 83.45 724.01 26.91 32% 
Golar LNG 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 82.76 499.83 22.36 27% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 82.61 899.84 30 36% 
FreeSeas 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 82.61 970.42 31.15 38% 
Torm A/S 50%         


Companies % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
Nordic American 50% 81.74 943.95 30.72 38% 
D/S Norden 50%         
A.P. Moller 50% 81.41 733.03 27.07 33% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 81.37 1213.34 34.83 43% 
D/S Norden 50%         
FreeSeas 50% 80.52 1318.45 36.31 45% 
D/S Norden 50%         
TopShips 50% 79.87 1403.85 37.47 47% 
CMB 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 77.97 367.04 19.16 25% 
Frontline 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 76.54 653.91 25.57 33% 
Teekay 50%         
Frontline 50% 75.89 920.68 30.34 40% 
D/S Norden 50%         
TopShips 50% 74.61 508.07 22.54 30% 
Overseas 50%         
Teekay 50% 74.46 1416.28 37.63 51% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 72.95 430.84 20.76 28% 
EURONAV 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 72.01 562.8 23.72 33% 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50%         
TopShips 50% 71.69 242.97 15.59 22% 
Nordic American 50%         
Golar LNG 50% 71.32 734.86 27.11 38% 
TopShips 50%         
CMB 50% 70.87 988.88 31.45 44% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 70.8 411.42 20.28 29% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 70.65 858.77 29.3 41% 
Torm A/S 50%         
TopShips 50% 70.47 925.59 30.42 43% 
FreeSeas Inc. 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 69.93 1496.93 38.69 55% 
D/S Norden 50%         
A.P. Moller 50% 68.72 1142.79 33.81 49% 
D/S Norden 50%         


Companies % Investment E(Return) Variance StD % StD 
D/S Norden 50% 68.57 2165 46.53 68% 
Torm A/S 50%         
TopShips 50% 65.83 397.28 19.93 30% 
Frontline 50%         
TopShips 50% 64.41 644.81 25.39 39% 
Teekay 50%         
TopShips 50% 60.81 469.58 21.67 36% 
EURONAV 50%         
Wilh Wilhelmsen 50% 59.87 609.22 24.68 41% 
TopShips 50%         
TopShips 50% 58.67 459.83 21.44 37% 
A.P. Moller 50%         
TopShips 50% 58.52 873.23 29.55 50% 
Torm A/S 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 57.97 1425.99 37.76 65% 
D/S Norden 50%         
Stolt Nielsen 50% 47.91 581.04 24.1 50% 
TopShips 50%         
TopShips 50% 45.83 1469.19 38.33 84% 
D/S Norden 50%         
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Annex C: Ship Management Policy Questionnaire 
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